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This thesis is the result of a thought process on how Norwegian Special Operation 
Forces could adapt to requirements for transformation in a changed security environment. 
The end of the Cold War initiated questions and concerns about how this organization 
best should adapt, not only to changed security threats, but also to changed economic 
realities for the Norwegian Armed Forces in general. Competition for scarce resources is 
likely to create turf wars. This is not a Special Operations phenomenon, nor is it unique to 
the Norwegian defense. My background in the Norwegian Special Operations community 
has led to reflections on the future of these units. These reflections were further refined 
throughout my time at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
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makes me biased.  However, the content, analysis, and recommendations in this thesis 
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I. TRANSFORMING NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2001, the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) has been through one of the 
largest transformation processes in the modern history of the state.1 A recent government 
publication, White Paper no. 42 (2003-2004), Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret 
(Continuing Modernization of the Norwegian Armed Forces), which outlines the 
framework for the military between 2005 and 2008, notes that the NAF transformation is 
proceeding in accordance with political guidelines set forth in the earlier White Paper no. 
45 (2000-2001), Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002- 2005 [Reorganizing the 
Norwegian Armed Forces 2002- 2005].2 The overarching goal of both documents is to 
change NAF from a threat-based organization developed for Cold War scenarios to a 
capability-based organization able to meet diffuse challenges in a new security 
environment.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the military transformation has been a continuous 
process to meet changes in both the security environment and economic realities. Which 
of these factors counts more is a matter of debate, but it is generally understood that the 
Cold War military structure was inadequate for the current security challenges. The 
economic framework will always be subject to question; conventional wisdom holds that 
the existing defense budget will remain essentially fixed in coming years. The implicit 
challenge is to develop the military structure within existing economic constraints.3  
 
1  Forsvarsdepartementet, St.Prp.Nr.42 (2003-2004): Den Videre Moderniseringen Av Forsvaret i 
Perioden 2005-2008 [Modernizing the Armed Forces 2005-2008] (Oslo, Norway: Forsvarsdepartementet 
[Ministry of Defense], 2004), p.9 , http://odin.dep.no/filarkiv/208105/STP0304042-TS.pdf (accessed 
August 20, 2005). 
2  Ibid., 9. 
3  Sverre Diesen, Moderniseringen Av Forsvaret - Status Og Utfordringer [Modernizing the Armed 
Forces - Status and Challenges] (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Defense, 2005), 
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00069/Forsvarssjefens_fore_69112a.doc (accessed February 10, 
2006). 
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This thesis looks specifically at transformation issues pertaining to Norwegian 
Special Operation Forces (NORSOF).4 According to White Paper 42 (a document 
essentially comparable to the US Quadrennial Defense Review) the political and military 
leadership of Norway have both emphasized the increased relevancy of a national special 
operations (SO) capability. However, the question examined here is the degree to which 
existing NORSOF organizational structure is inconsistent with emerging SOF roles and 
missions. This question is derived from apparent contradictions in statements between 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Chief of Defense (CHOD). According to White Paper 
42, MoD states that the Navy’s Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) and the Army’s Hærens 
Jegerkommando (HJK) will continue to exist as two separate units within their respective 
parent services.5 However, CHOD’s prior recommendation was to disband both units and 
create a new special operations force (SOF).6  Where and how the new unit will be 
organized is not specified, and is among the subjects of this inquiry. 
Although White Paper no.42, subsequently referred to as the Long Term Plan 
(LTP), is already in effect, it is important to study its details for several reasons. First, the 
CHOD’s recommendation to stand up a new SOF unit will probably re-emerge as the 
next LTP is prepared. The inconsistency reflects a divergent view of NORSOF’s 
collective capabilities. As this study will show, a core transformation principle is to 
eliminate redundant capabilities. That is, the ideal is that units that traditionally hold 
equal or similar roles and missions should be merged, or one of them disbanded. To 
phrase it as a question:  Should both the Navy and Army retain separate SOF units with 
essentially redundant capabilities, or should the missions and roles of Army and Navy 
SOF be clearly differentiated? 
 
4 In this paper NORSOF is used exclusively as a common term for the two tactical units 
Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) and Hærens Jegerkommando (HJK). MJK is a Naval SOF unit while HJK 
is an Army SOF unit. The term NORSOF has no organizational meaning beyond this. The Air Force is 
currently tasked to stand up a SOF-capable helicopter unit, 137 Air Wing. This unit is not included in the 
discussion in this paper. 
5  Forsvarsdepartementet, St.Prp.Nr.42 (2003-2004): Den Videre Moderniseringen Av Forsvaret i 
Perioden 2005-2008, 56. 
6  Forsvaret, "Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003 [Chief of Defense Recommendation 
2003]," Forsvaret [Norwegian Defense], 
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00031/Forsvarssjefens_Mili_31672a.pdf (accessed August 26, 
2005). 
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Second, according to the LTP, the Norwegian military is presently required to 
develop a capability within an organizational structure which runs contrary to its own 
recommendations. This suggests the possibility that either one or both units will not 
develop optimally.   
Third, the Norwegian government has not indicated why and how NORSOF 
should expand. To transform effectively, a relevant framework is required in which 
missions and roles can be specified. This framework does not exist.  
Despite these challenges, NORSOF’s role in contemporary wars and conflicts has 
proved increasingly important. Since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 
2001, NORSOF deployments to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 
have gained considerable media attention, and the military has subsequently released 
more information on both MJK and HJK. Using unclassified sources, this thesis is an 
attempt to contribute to the continuous development of two professional units critical to 
Norway’s national security. 
 
B. THE LONG TERM PLANNING PROCESS 
This section briefly explains the long term planning process to provide a basic 
understanding of the main stakeholders and the documents generated throughout the 
process.  
Every four years, the government issues a Long Term Plan to the military, 
specifying, among other things, its future structure. The LTP is issued as a White Paper 
or Stortingsproposisjon (St.prp.) from MoD on behalf of the government. Before the 
proposition goes into effect, it requires majority support from the parliament.  
Before the proposition is developed and forwarded to the parliament for a vote, 
CHOD issues his recommendations to MoD through a committee called Militærfaglig 
Utredning. CHOD’s military recommendations are based on existing economic 
constraints and national security political goals, along with other considerations. MoD 
adjusts CHOD’s recommendations in accordance with political opportunities and 
constraints. 
A proposition requires majority support from the parliament before it takes effect. 
The parliament discusses the proposition in a Standing Committee on Defense, which in 
principle consists of representatives from all political parties.7  The Standing Committee 
on Defense make comments on the proposition through a document called Innstilling, 
which is an amendment to the proposition. The amendment and the proposition are then 
forwarded to the parliament for a vote. For all practical purposes, the outcome of the 
voting is determined in the committee. Once the proposition is accepted in the 
parliament, the proposition goes into effect. Figure 1 shows the political and military 
hierarchy and the functional relation between government and parliament.  
After the proposition is in effect, MoD will issue a Letter of Instruction, or 
Iverksettingsbrev, to CHOD, explicitly stating what the government wants the military to 
do in the forthcoming period. The process including relevant documents is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1.   Political and military hierarchies and functional relationships 
 
The process is simple, but involves political trade-offs on many levels. Within the 
military organization, CHOD’s recommendations are often perceived as controversial 
                                                 
7  Stortinget, Stortinget (Norwegian Parliament) Rules of Procedure, 2004, 
http://www.stortinget.no/english/rules_of_procedure.pdf (accessed September 8, 2005). See Section 8.  
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when they suggest that units or capabilities be reorganized or disbanded. By the same 
token, political trade-offs have implications for the organizational structure. Base 
realignment has been a contested issue for domestic policy reasons. More importantly, 
the recent strategic shift from national territorial defense to international expeditionary-
type operations has sparked political tension. Military support for the U.S. led Operation 




Figure 2.   The planning process (including document flow) of the Parliament, the 
Government, and the Armed Forces 
 
The current LTP is St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004). A majority of Parliament clearly 
supported an increased focus on special operations capabilities. Not only does the 
government emphasize the importance of increasing existing capabilities, it also decided 
to create a special operations capable air wing to increase tactical support to NORSOF. 
These are important signals from the political-strategic level, and are also within 
CHOD’s recommendations. However, while CHOD recommended disbanding MJK and 
HJK and create a single SOF unit, the Government decided that both units should be 
maintained and developed within their respective branch of service. 
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C. THE PROBLEM 
While the Government states that NORSOF’s capabilities are to be expanded, it 
does not say anything about why and how the units are supposed to expand, as is 
common for conventional capabilities. There might be rational reasons for this lack of 
guidance in unclassified documents. Yet, this inconsistency, along with the lack of 
political guidance, suggests that at least two competing perspectives exist on emerging 
NORSOF roles and missions.  
These competing views are mirrored within the military establishment. This 
assertion is first of all based on the assumption that political leaders normally do follow 
CHOD’s recommendations. Political debate is sparked by base realignment or force 
structure because of employment, budgetary, or security policy issues.  The extent to 
which the merger of two tactical units should create the same political debate is 
questionable.  
There are two schools of thought that have led to these competing views: the view 
that would merge MJK and HJK and establish a new unit under a single service- branch, 
and the other view, which appears to emphasize maintaining the status quo. The first 
school, which CHOD represents, asserts that to merge the two units is the only rational 
organizational form given that both units operate within the same spectrum of missions. 
Maintaining two units producing the same output is not consistent with guidelines for the 
current transformation. Merging MJK and HJK will eliminate interoperability issues, a 
transformation factor pertaining specifically to NORSOF. Factors pertaining to the 
current transformation process are discussed in Chapter IV. 
The other school of thought, represented by the Government, emphasizes that the 
two units serve different purposes and complement each other over a wide spectrum of 
roles and missions. A naval SOF unit is better suited to support naval operations than an 
Army SOF unit. Maritime capabilities cannot be adequately trained and executed within 
an Army infrastructure. Service orientation is thus held as a capability on its own. 
Which school best serves the national interest is hard to determine. If missions 
and roles are not clearly stated, a decision on future organizational arrangements will 
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necessarily be based on perceptions. The competing views suggest this is the case. Not 
only is political guidance unclear, but there is also no military strategy that could have 
guided this development. Hence a turf war has evolved over how to implement the LTP 
with regard to NORSOF as a whole. This applies to the tactical as well as the strategic 
level. 
Meanwhile, for better or worse, both units are expanding as a result of their 
respective Service Chief’s benevolence. It is the Service Chiefs’ responsibility to meet 
personnel constraints within their service branch. Given current personnel constraints, 
arguably the most critical factor in the current transformation of NAF in general, how can 
MJK and HJK, both referred to as a strategic resource, insure they receive the proper 
priority to meet the ambitious goals stated by Parliament? The current situation can be 
beneficial for the individual units given their respective integration and utility in their 
parent services. Arguably, HJK is better integrated in the Army than MJK is in the Navy. 
Small unit tactics, the essence of SOF operations, are more familiar to the Army than the 
Navy. But if SOF is a strategic resource, then decisions pertaining to roles and missions 
should not be left to their parent services to decide without proper guidance. This 
suggests that questions pertaining to NORSOF future roles are reduced to the tactical/ 
operational rather than the political/ strategic level.  
Based on this brief analysis, this paper hypothesizes that the existing NORSOF 
organizational structure is inconsistent with emerging roles and missions. A full test of 
this hypothesis in an unclassified thesis is unlikely. At this stage in the analysis, there is 
no clear answer. But since the Cold War has ended, and the security environment 
definitely has changed, Cold War missions and roles might very well be obsolete; this is 
topic at least worth review. To begin such a process by discussing whether existing units 
should merge seems premature. The inconsistency suggests a lack of a thorough review 
of future roles and missions. There is at least lack of consensus on the issue. Chief of 
Defense Gen. Diesen claims that current funding of the NAF contradicts the Cold War 
concept of maintaining a “balanced defense structure” – a military structure consisting of 
the full spectrum of capabilities.8 It follows necessarily that capabilities will be 
 
8  Diesen, Moderniseringen Av Forsvaret - Status Og Utfordringer. 
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abandoned as economic constraints force a reorganization of the structure. However, 
reorganizing the structure will not in itself reveal which capabilities to maintain or 
disband. A different framework for addressing NORSOF’s future roles is thus required in 
order to address its future organizational structure. 
One framework for addressing future transformation of US SOF is proposed by 
Christopher Lamb, former director of US Policy Planning in the Office for the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.9 According to 
Lamb, the following criteria should be used when discussing SOF roles ands missions in 
the aftermath of the Cold War: 
1. The nature of the security threat and the anticipated nature of the future 
security environment 
2. The security strategy adopted to deal with the changed environment 
3. The nature of the forces themselves 
Although Lamb proposes this framework for US SOF, there are no apparent 
impediments to using the same framework as a starting point in discussing NORSOF 
future roles and missions. Although other frameworks certainly could be applied, such as 
NATO requirements or a comparison with comparable European nations, Lamb’s 
suggestion has several advantages.   
First, defense planning is a question of national needs and requirements. For a 
smaller nation, Alliance requirements certainly apply. Commitments made by NATO’s 
member countries in Prague in 2002 exemplify this.10 But defense planning by consensus 
has so far not transcended national requirements to any significant extent. Standardization 
of forces is arguably still one of NATO’s biggest challenges. Norway’s newly 
commissioned Nansen-class Frigates exemplify the purchase of a combat platform whose 
primary role, anti-submarine warfare, is not in demand within NATO. Likewise, purchase 
of new airplanes to substitute for an ageing fleet of F-16’s is not a NATO project. At 
 
9  Christopher Lamb, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," Special Warfare (July 
1995), 2-9.  
10 Information on the current transformation of NATO, including the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment, can be obtained from NATO’s homepages at www.nato.int.  
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best, it is a common effort among a few nations, arguably for the benefit of reduced costs. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that the transformation of strategic SOF units will be a combined 
effort within NATO. Lamb’s framework, focusing on national requirements, therefore 
seems more plausible and relevant as a starting point for discussing NORSOF 
transformation. 
An extensive comparison with specific other nations is arguably most feasible for 
tactical reasons. In comparing units within NATO for standardization on techniques, 
tactics, and procedures, interoperability certainly will improve. This thesis, however, is 
not concerned with standardization at the tactical level, although standardization is a 
factor internal to NORSOF transformation, as discussed below. The questions raised in 
this paper are instead focused on NORSOF’s potential and utility as a national asset. 
Norway’s national requirements for strategic special operations (arguably a new role, but 
consistent with the LTP) can hardly be contrasted with, e.g., British requirements. 
Tactically, Norwegian units, whether SOF or conventional, can certainly operate in the 
same physical environment as their British counterparts. Strategically, however, this is 
not true, because of the national differences in foreign policy agendas, traditions, and the 
integration of the military as an instrument of statecraft.  
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on Lamb’s framework, this paper is organized to address the following 
questions: 
1. What are the traditional NORSOF roles and missions? 
2. What is the nature of the security environment and perceived future threats? 
3. What are the national strategies available to deal with the new environment? 
4. What should be the future roles and mission of NORSOF? 
Especially important, in Lamb’s view, is the nature of the mission:  
If Special Operations Forces are asked to conduct missions contrary to 
their current nature, they eventually will evolve into different types of 
forces. The risks inherent in such change is that SOF might duplicate 
 10
                                                
capabilities that already exist in other forces and that they would be unable 
to effectively conduct traditional special-operations missions.11  
The principal method used to answer these questions will be a review of existing 
doctrine, literature, and practice. National and NATO doctrine, Forsvarets Fellesoperative 
Doktrine (FFOD) and Allied Joint Publication 1 (AJP-01(B)), both unclassified 
documents, are therefore essential for this examination, along with various other relevant 
government documents. With the exception of the WWII period, references to current 
NORSOF history are sparse. Erling Krange, a former Navy frogman, has published a 
book on Norwegian naval diving which includes a partial description of the early history 
of MJK. No similar publication is available to this author’s knowledge, on HJK, except 
what can be found on Norwegian defense web pages. Due to recent international 
deployments beginning in the mid-1990’s, MJK and HJK have become increasingly 
visible in the national media. Still, tactical information on the units themselves are 
protected from public access, and rightfully so. But there is no reference to NORSOF as 
part of national strategy except as a relevant and competent niche capability for NATO.12  
Internationally, the literature on SOF is broader. Most of this literature is 
concerned with historical anecdotes from tactical battles or the story of the tactical units 
themselves. Interestingly, tactical information on MJK and HJK has become more 
available though international literature.13 Less has been published on SOF’s strategic 
utility. Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray, both noted strategists and defense analysts, are cited 
in this paper due to their contributions on SOF and strategy. Lucien Vandenbroucke is 
cited for his evaluation of SOF as an instrument of US foreign policy in a book he wrote 
while working for the US State Department. Much of the relevant literature is fairly new, 
as prior to 1990 SOF in general had a mixed reputation. After all, conventional strategy, 
based on doctrines of attrition, dominated during the Cold War, and this is a strategy not 
 
11  Lamb, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," 2. 
12  Forsvarsdepartementet, Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces (Oslo, 
Norway: Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], 2004), 73-74, 
http://www.odin.no/fd/english/doc/handbooks/010051-120204/dok-bn.html (accessed August 21, 2005). 
13 For example, see Leroy Thompson, The Rescuers: The World’s Top Anti-Terrorist Units (Boulder, 
Co, Paladin Press, 1986), pp. 90-91, and Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose 
(Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989), 66-69. 
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necessarily favorable to SOF. The mixed reputation of SOF especially applies to US SOF 
after Vietnam, as documented by Thomas K. Adams. The British experience is arguably 
different, as the British successfully utilized SOF in post-colonial conflicts throughout the 
Cold War era.14 However, less is written on the British SOF’s strategic utility compared 
to the US tradition. Overall, the bulk of the literature describing SOF’s role in a national, 
strategic perspective is influenced by US traditions and experiences. 
The end of the Cold War saw an upsurge of interest in SOF and its applicability in 
“small wars.” This has resulted in increased interest in the strategic use of SOF and a 
corresponding increase in articles on the subject. Although tactical stories still constitute 
the majority of published books, increasing numbers of relevant journal articles are being 
published through military journals and research institutes. Again, the articles are heavily 
influenced by US experience and lessons learned.  
The dominance of literature showing US influence might initially seem to make a 
scholarly approach, and hence its conclusions, less relevant for a small nation like 
Norway. However, as NAF and NORSOF increasingly focus on international operations, 
certain common principles, whether tactical or strategic, still apply. NATO doctrine 
resembles US doctrine in many ways, especially with regard to SOF. Knowing that 
national doctrine on SOF is more or less a blue-print of NATO’s doctrine, the US 
influence is already prevalent on the national level. The small nation’s dilemma, 
however, is to utilize these lessons for its own national purpose. It is unlikely that 
Norway will experience its own Vietnam, Malaya, Son Tay, or for that matter 
Afghanistan. 
Chapter II addresses historical as well as current NORSOF roles, missions, and 
structure. It begins with a general discussion of SOF to provide a conceptual framework 
for understanding special operations. Chapter II will answer the first question: What are 
the traditional NORSOF roles and missions? 
Chapter III focuses on current and future threats. This chapter is necessary to 
define the types of conflicts or threats that may in the future generate roles and missions. 
 
14 There are many accounts of UK SOF’s tactical employments after WWII. See, for example, Robin 
Neillands, In the Combat Zone: Special Forces Since 1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997). 
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The chapter also discusses national strategies to deal with future threats. Although no 
coherent military strategy exists, historical and existing practice, along with recent 
political statements, indicate how the military is used as an instrument of state power. 
Chapter III answers the second and third research questions:  What is the nature of the 
security environment and perceived future threats? What are the national strategies 
available to deal with the new environment? 
Chapter IV addresses the last research question:  What should be the future roles 
and mission of NORSOF? It suggests potentially new NORSOF roles and missions. The 
discussion is kept on an operational and strategic level; tactical level missions are 
generally not discussed. Whether HJK should have rubber boats or MJK should have 
vehicles is not important for this paper. More crucial is a conceptual clarification of roles 
in accordance with doctrinal terms. The chapter concludes with recommendations on 
future NORSOF transformation.  
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II. NORSOF: TRADITIONAL ROLES AND MISSION 
The first part of this chapter explores Special Operations (SO) and Special 
Operation Forces (SOF) in a national context through a review of existing doctrine, the 
best unclassified source of guidance from a military perspective, and existing literature 
on the subject. The last part of the chapter explores historical and recent practice in order 
to establish relevant facts about traditional roles and missions. 
 
A. DOCTRINE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (FFOD) is the central doctrinal document. It 
is divided into parts A and B. Principles regarding operations, including SO, are 
described in part B. Service based doctrines are subordinate to FFOD. There is no 
separate doctrine for SOF. 
According to FFOD, doctrine consists of fundamental principles pertaining to the 
development and use of military forces.15 Its central task is to describe the foundation for 
military activity, provide normative guidelines, and describe the capabilities needed to 
execute the doctrine. Doctrinal guidelines are not absolute, but rather strong 
recommendations. It is essential that doctrines change as required by security and defense 
policy, along with technological evolution. Accordingly, doctrine is only useful as a tool 
to the degree the future correlates with the past.16  
FFOD is in its general form based on NATO’s doctrine.17 Central to NATO’s 
doctrine is Allied Joint Publications, AJP-01 and AJP-3, Operations. As with FFOD, 
various service-based doctrines are subordinated AJP-01. Figure 3 illustrates the 
relationship between Norwegian and NATO doctrines.18 
 
15  Forsvarets Overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine Del A - Grunnlag [Joint Doctrine 
Part A - General] [Joint Doctrine part A] (Oslo, Norway: Department of Defense, 2000), 13. 
16  Ibid., 15. 
17  Ibid., ch. 1.5.1 and 1.5.2. 
18  Ibid., 18, table 1.1. 
 
Figure 3.   Structural resemblance between Norway and NATO’s doctrinal 
hierarchies (after FFOD part A)) 
 
Chapter 15 of FFOD part B, Spesialoperasjoner (Special Operations), is a 
translation of Chapter 8, Special Operations, in AJP-01(B). Little or nothing reflects a 
national adaptation of FFOD. Like AJP-01(B), FFOD part B does define and describe SO 
tasks and characteristics in a general way.  
1. Special Operations: Definition  
Defining SO is essential to distinguish SOF from conventional forces. Without a 
proper definition or understanding of what SOF represents, SO could easily be defined as 
whatever a decision-maker wants SOF to be, including as a substitute for conventional 
forces. Likewise, if all there is to being “special” is a certain amount of training and 
equipment, most military units could probably be defined as special. An article recently 
published at the official defense website illustrates the point by claiming that NATO’s 
training center for SOF “educates special soldiers from, among others, the HJK, Coastal 
Rangers Commando, MJK and ISTAR.”19 The point is not to insist that non-SOF units 
are not specialists. Coastal Rangers and ISTAR do perform special roles. But they are not 
conducting special operations. 
Defining SO and SOF are important for functional purposes. Colin Gray asserts 
that “it is imperative to define special operations, but there is peril in the exercise.”20 A 
definition can be either “so vague and inclusive as to provide no meaningful guidance or 
                                                 
19  Lars M. Hovtun, "Spesialister Får NATO- Trening [Specialists Trained by NATO]," Norwegian 
Defense, http://www.mil.no/haren/start/article.jhtml?articleID=108557 (accessed October 11, 2005). 
Author’s translation.  
20  Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), 144. 
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so rigid and focused as to risk inhibiting the imagination of special operations forces 
themselves and of their political and military clients.”21  
A simplistic definition of SOF is “that they are what conventional forces are 
not.”22 Conventional forces are normally thought of as forces organized, trained, and 
equipped to defeat other conventional forces through battles. According to Ross Kelly, 
former senior analyst with the US Defense Intelligence Agency, 
[t]he thrust of conventional force training…is the achievement of 
consistent performance of routine tasks to the highest attainable standard. 
By contrast, the emphasis in special operations is on directing individual 
skills to the accomplishment of functions unique to a given mission, 
generally a high-risk one. Improvisation and independent thinking are 
essential.23 
Following Kelly, a significant difference between conventional forces and SOF is the 
latter’s emphasis on individual skills and the ability to perform unique missions. This is 
the central argument for claiming that the scope of conventional units is specialization 
while SOF is more general in nature. Kelly claims that special operations “address a 
spectrum of challenges not normally considered appropriate for regular armed military or 
national forces.”24 What is appropriate or not can certainly be argued. One traditional 
distinction is SOF’s role as a military component operating independently in enemy 
controlled territory – behind enemy lines. 
NATO’s definition of special operations is 
Military activities conducted by specially designated, organised, trained 
and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of 
employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are 
conducted across the full range of military operations (peace, crisis and 
conflict) independently or in co-ordination with operations of conventional 
forces to achieve military, political, economic and psychological 
objectives or a combination thereof. Political-military considerations may 
 
21  Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 144. 
22  Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,” 3. 
23  Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 
1989), xvii. 
24  Ibid., xvi. 
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require covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of 
physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.25 
This definition requires some clarification. First, it states that SOF uses 
operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. To 
a certain extent this is correct. But at the same time, there are few operational techniques 
unique to SOF as such, as Gray also notes.26 NATO’s definition emphasizes SOF’s 
ability to employ unique skills more than anything else. Tugwell and Charter use the term 
“unorthodox” to distinguish SO from conventional operations and units.27 Unorthodox 
must be understood as referring to missions rather than techniques. It is the “quantity and 
intensity or level of skills required of each man or very small group”28 that makes the 
significant difference, not the skill set itself. The higher level and broader spectrum of 
skills at the individual or small unit level make SOF more applicable to certain types of 
operations. Special Operations Executive’s (SOE) operation against the heavy water plant 
at Rjukan in 1943 did not involve skills exclusive to SOF. Rather, a combination of 
personal skills, initiative, rigorous training and the ability to improvise made the 
operation a success.  
The spectrum of conflict is defined from peace through crisis and conflict. The 
latter should be understood as war, a term included in national doctrine. In a post-Cold 
War scenario, this must be interpreted as the spectrum of conflict in the area of operation 
rather than in Norway proper. This point might seem obsolete, but the distinction is 
important because “war” is a negative word in comparison to the arguably more neutral 
term “operations.” This became clear during NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, 
when then-prime minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, denied that Norwegian F-16 pilots 
 
 
25  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B)NATO, 2002), 8.1. FFOD explicitly states this is the 
definition used in national doctrine. See Forsvarets Overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine 
Del B - Operasjoner [Joint Doctrine Part B - Operations] [Joint Doctrine part B] (Oslo, Norway: 
Department of Defense, 2000), 203. 
26  Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 146. 
27 Ibid., 145. Tugwell and Charter define Special Operations as “[s]mall-scale, clandestine, covert or 
overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant 
political or military objects in support of foreign policy.”   
28  Ibid., 146. 
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 were engaged in war, claiming they were rather “part of a restricted military 
campaign.”29 To wrongly interpret the level of conflict is likely to result in misuse of 
military power.  
A feature arguably pertaining more than anything to the special image of SOF is 
its association with covert and clandestine operations. NATO’s definition uses the terms 
discreet and covert, while FFOD use the terms discreet, covert and clandestine. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the terms covert, clandestine, and overt will be used. A covert 
operation conceals its sponsor, i.e. national authorities do not take responsibility whether 
the operation succeeds or not. A clandestine operation conceals its existence, i.e., mission 
success hinges on the ability to keep planning and execution secret. The sponsor will, 
however, claim responsibility upon completion. An overt operation neither denies its 
nature nor its sponsor. A SO can be any of these types as well as a combination of covert 
and clandestine.  
However, there are organizational and practical as well as moral and 
constitutional implications to the conduct of covert operations. Discussing the legal 
implications of snatching Osama Bin Laden in a covert operation involving US SOF in 
1993, Vice President Al Gore’s remarked to President Bill Clinton that “[o]f course it’s a 
violation of international law, that’s why it’s a covert action.”30 Covert operations are 
necessarily associated with high political risk. Special operations is traditionally a high 
risk venture for its sponsors. This is also reflected in NATO’s definition. Without this 
understanding of risk at the political and military strategic level, NORSOF might not be 
utilized at maximum capacity.  
Special operations forces can achieve much within a certain set of parameters. But 
high gains for low costs come with greater risk. Militarily, the risk is the loss of personnel 




29  Halvor Elvik, "Ord Om Krig [Words on War]," Dagbladet, 
http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/1999/03/26/161500.html (accessed September 9, 2005). Prime Minister 
Bondevik later admitted that the pilots had participated in a war. 
30 Cited in Richard A. Clarke, Against all Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free 
Press, 2004), 144. 
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2. Special Operations Missions 
It is normal in the US literature to separate SOF tasks in two categories, the 
commando role and the unconventional warfare role. David Tucker, Associate Professor 
of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, California, offers a slightly 
different framework in an article on US SOF, coauthored with Christopher Lamb. Tucker 
and Lamb claim there are two principal modes in which SOF accomplishes its tasks: the 
direct action approach, which brings force directly in contact with the enemy, and the 
indirect approach, which brings force to the enemy indirectly through a surrogate force. 
The essential idea is that there are capabilities for both direct action and indirect action.31  
This separation is not recognized in NATO doctrine. Instead, AJP-01(B) defines 
three principal SO tasks: Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action 
(DA), and Military Assistance (MA). Using broad descriptions, existing doctrine 
certainly does not limit SOF’s potential. While doctrine should not limit the use of SOF 
by narrowing its potential tasks, it should not be so broad as to be meaningless. Whether 
the latter is the case can be argued. However, the principal tasks can be thought of as 
general capabilities.  
Strategic reconnaissance tends to complement operational or strategic intelligence 
collectors in order to support the operational or strategic decision-making process. 
Strategic reconnaissance is exemplified in AJP-01(B) as: 
- Area assessment 
- Advance force operations (reconnaissance and surveillance prior to 
conventional operations) 
- Target acquisition 
- Early warning on enemy forces concentration, movement, command and 
control, etc. 
- Intelligence on critical infrastructure in denied territory (meteorological, 
geographic, hydrographic, and post-attack reconnaissance) 
- Close target reconnaissance  
 
31  David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, "Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging 
Threats," Strategic Forum, no. 219 (January 2006, 2006), 1-6, www.ndu.edu/inss (accessed January 31, 
2006). 
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The list is not exhaustive, and neither should it be. The important aspect is the 
emphasis on operational or strategic intelligence collection. The question to be asked, 
however, is if current doctrine embodies ghosts from the past, i.e., Cold War strategic 
requirements.  Do modern conflicts require a redefinition of the term? Denied territory, at 
least, has an expanded meaning after the Cold War. Increased urbanization and increased 
use of information technology are only two scenarios that require rethinking existing 
concepts. The classic Cold War scenario with its conventional, linear battlefronts is 
increasingly replaced by peace support operations and insurgent-type conflicts where 
frontlines simply do not exist. Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrative examples. In both 
conflicts, conventional combat operations terminated in a matter of weeks or months. The 
wars, however, are far from over. The relevance of intelligence however, has not 
decreased. Despite technological revolutions, it is questionable how far technology can 
substitute for human eyes and ears.  
Direct action (DA) is normally thought of as small-scale offensive raids with 
operational or strategic value. Such raids, according to AJP-01(B), are “normally limited 
in scope and duration.”32 The WWII British X-craft attacks on the battleship Tirpitz in 
Altafjord, and SOE raid on the heavy-water plant at Rjukan, are examples of strategic 
raids. The time factor associated with planning these operations is not necessarily limited, 
as both missions took months and years to develop. But once initiated, they clearly had 
both short durations and limited scopes. Examples of DA include the following: 
- Attack on critical targets, whether personnel or materiel 
- Attack on command and control lines or nodes 
- Capture or recovery of designated personnel 
- Operations involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
- Personnel recovery in hostile territory (CSAR) 
As for strategic reconnaissance, a changed battlefield might also redefine where, 
when, and how DA is executed, including the legal and moral ramifications of DA. 
Conflicts short of war represent challenges not seen during WWII. Except for WMD, 
 
32  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), 8-3. 
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doctrine refers to examples conveniently fitting Cold War thinking with its emphasis on a 
tactical battlefront and strategic depth.  
Military assistance (MA) as defined in current doctrine is associated with training 
friendly or indigenous forces for a counterinsurgency role or irregular warfare. It can also 
be thought of as what strategic reconnaissance and direct action are not. Parts of the MA 
conception are closely associated with the term unconventional warfare (UW), a core task 
of US Special Forces (USSF). Examples of MA are: 
- Assisting indigenous forces by training, equipping, or supporting them to 
exploit “a hostile power’s political, military, economic or psychological 
weaknesses.”33 This is often referred to as irregular or partisan warfare. 
- Assisting friendly governments by training, equipping, or supporting their 
military and paramilitary units to provide internal stability. This is in US 
terminology referred to as Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
- Assisting in the establishment of escape and evasion nets in hostile territory 
- Training friendly forces to enhance alliance interoperability. This can be 
accomplished by joint exercises at all levels. 
In addition, MA includes support to peace operations, a role arguably associated 
with post-Cold War conflicts. Support to peace operations includes: 
- Technical support within areas like organizational planning, command and 
control (C2), health care, security, etc. 
- Using cultural and language skills to provide assets for conflict resolution 
through liaison teams. 
MA has traditionally not been part of NAF’s focus, although Norway has a 
longstanding tradition of participating in UN operations. Nor has MA been a task of 
importance for NORSOF, as will be shown later. Before NAF’s focus started to move 
outwards in the mid-1990’s, deploying for UN operations was not considered career 
enhancing for an officer. This indicates the low regard for UN missions in general and 
hence the potential for developing indirect strategies within NAF as an organization.34  
 
33  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), 8-4. 
34  Ståle Ulriksen, Den Norske Forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt Eller Folkeforsvar? [Norwegian 
Defense Traditions: Military Power or People's Army?] (Oslo, Norway: Pax Forlag A/S, 2002), 236-238. 
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According to Tucker and Lamb, strategic reconnaissance and direct action fall 
within SO direct action capabilities, while military assistance falls within indirect action 
capabilities. An important observation is that the two approaches can be mutually 
supportive. Likewise, using indirect capabilities “might include direct engagement of 
enemy forces.”35 Tucker and Lamb’s division of roles will be used to clarify the 
discussion throughout this paper. 
Doctrine does not say anything about missions and roles as developed within 
various services, i.e., whether there are characteristics, requirements, roles, or missions 
that distinguish Army, Navy, or Air Force SOF. Doctrine can therefore only offer general 
guidelines for NORSOF roles and missions. In particular, there is little or no guidance on 
how to understand service-based division of roles or NORSOF’s strategic utility.  
3. Strategic Special Operations  
Strategic special operations require a separate definition because current doctrine 
does not address this topic. As per NATO doctrine, SOF pursues strategic objectives, 
implicitly addressing SOF as an operational level asset. According to Vandenbroucke, 
strategic special operations are strikes that “sought to achieve major foreign policy aims 
rather than just tactical objectives….These are secret military or paramilitary strikes, 
approved at the highest level of the U.S. government after detailed review.36  
Vandenbroucke claims that strategic SO support political rather than strategic 
objectives. Strategic SO are thus part of the U.S. government’s arsenal of state power, 
and as such represent an alternative to conventional military power. Vandenbroucke’s 
definition is narrow, and focuses exclusively on direct action operations. His case studies 
specifically include toppling foreign regimes (Bay of Pigs, 1961) and hostage rescue 
operations (Son Tay, 1970 and Iran rescue attempt, 1980). To qualify as a strategic SO, 
 
35  Tucker and Lamb, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, 1. 
36  Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4. He emphasizes it is the unconventional application 
of force that differentiates strategic SO from conventional strikes in support of U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. The latter is exemplified by the 1986 air strike against Libya. Unconventional SO are 
exemplified by the Bay of Pigs (1961), the Son Tay raid (1970), and the attempt to rescue US hostages in 
Iran (1980). The latter eventually led to a reorganization of US SOF chain of command and the emergence 
of USSOCOM in 1986.   
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the operation must support a foreign policy crisis. Hence political oversight of planning 
and execution is required beyond what is considered normal for military operations.37  
There might be more to strategic SO than strikes and a foreign policy crisis; 
military assistance could include operations through its definition that could be perceived 
as supporting foreign policy. Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon, Director, Review and Military 
Liaison, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner in Canada, 
asserts in a concept paper published at the joint Special Operations University in Florida 
that SOF is one of Canada’s two strategic assets, intelligence being the other, because 
“[t]he future employment of CANSOF, as a training asset to assist friendly nations, could 
ensure high-quality training while, at the same time, extending and leveraging Canadian 
foreign policy and interests and influence abroad.38 
This might be true, but it raises the question whether the same effect might not be 
achieved with conventional assets. An extended conventional bilateral training program 
seems initially likely to achieve the same foreign policy effect. Also, a training program 
is less likely to be politically controlled beyond what is considered normal. To 
differentiate strategic SO from what can be labeled general SO, Vandenbroucke’s 
definition seems more plausible than Taillon’s. 
Hence, for this thesis, strategic SO is defined as covert or clandestine direct action 
operation in support of national foreign policy objectives, approved at the highest level 
within the Norwegian government.  
Conducting strategic operations requires SO influence at the appropriate level. 
Without such influence, strategic SO is not likely to be an option for policy makers. This 
assertion is based on the US experience and literature on this specific topic. It is 
commonly known that US SOF units were not held in high esteem by the conventional 
military leadership after the Vietnam War. US SOF Units were downsized, much like 
they were after WWII. This downsizing reached a culminating point in the catastrophic 
1980 attempt to rescue embassy US personnel being held hostage in Teheran, Iran. The 
 
37  Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options, ix. 
38  J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special Operations Forces: A 
Future Concept Paper (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2005), 3. 
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incident triggered the 1986 creation of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
Once established, the new command started a process of leveraging SOF’s influence, 
especially within the military hierarchy.39  
Having USSOCOM as an overarching organization with distinct funding 
authority, responsibility for doctrines and for coordinating tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) within the complete SOF community, helped to improve SOF’s 
capabilities. It can be argued, however, that USSOCOM’s strategic role is still 
challenged. According to Schultz, organizational behavior and lack of strategic influence 
prevented SO from being an option to eliminate the emerging threat of Al Qaeda prior to 
9/11.40 Although Schultz’s article is written in hindsight, his argument illustrates the 
obstacles to SOF being used for foreign policy purposes. Much changed after 9/11, 
illustrating the importance of a visible crisis. Yet, according to the definition, it can be 
argued that current SOF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are not strategic special 
operations; to the degree these are strategic, they support military strategic objectives, 
which again support foreign policy. 
NORSOF’s strategic importance is reflected in St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004), stating 
that NORSOF is a strategic asset. St.prp.nr.42 also emphasizes that the military strategic 
level should be strengthened, and that it is necessary to “increase manning at the 
operational level in order to strengthen Commander National Joint Headquarter’s ability 
to direct SOF missions when authority is transferred.”41 Command authority is thus 
retained at the military strategic level. The statements also indicate that this level is not 
yet capable of acting in its role as a strategic umbrella for NORSOF. The degree to which 
strategic SO currently has a role in the national context beyond the rhetorical is therefore 
 
39  Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997), 319. See especially pp. 60-90 for a thorough account of 
political involvement in this process. 
40  Richard H. Shultz Jr., "Nine Reasons Why we Never Sent our Special Operations Forces After Al 
Qaeda Before 9/11," The Weekly Standard, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/003/613twavk.asp?pg=1 (accessed 
February 7, 2006). 
41  Forsvarsdepartementet, St.Prp.Nr.42 (2003-2004), 56, author’s translation. 
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unclear. More importantly, strategic SO presents a specter of operations conducted in 
peace, not in war.  
4. Levels of Military Operations and Organization 
 A discussion of levels of military operations is necessary to illustrate NORSOF’s 
operational or strategic potential. This section also includes historical and current 
NORSOF C2 arrangements.  
 FFOD distinguishes four levels of military operations.42 
a. The political-military level, represented by the Government. 
b. The military-strategic level, represented by the Chief of Defense  
c. The military-operational level, represented by the National Joint Headquarters 
(NJHQ) 
d. The military-tactical level, represented by tactical units 
The political-military level, hereafter referred to as the political level, is 
responsible for coordinating elements of national power in order to secure the nation’s 
interests, whether economic, diplomatic, psychological or military.43 The military- 
strategic level, hereafter called the strategic level, is responsible for coordinating military 
efforts to support political intentions. The operational level is responsible for planning 
and conducting joint operations as set forth in strategic directives, while the tactical level 
is responsible for tactical deployments and the use of force in support of operational 
plans. The hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
42 These levels are retrieved from FFOD part A, ch 2.8., but are adapted to reflect recent changes in 
the military organizational structure as set forth in St.prp.nr.45 (2000-2001).  
43  Forsvarets Overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine Del A - Grunnlag [Joint Doctrine 
Part A - General], 35. 
                         
Figure 4.   Levels of military operation, and corresponding levels of responsibility 
 
The strategic level is retained by CHOD in an integrated Ministry of Defense 
which in turn represents the political strategic level.44 The political and strategic 
command level is integrated and co-located in Oslo.  The operational level leadership is 
located at the NJHQ in Stavanger. Joint SOF operations are executed from a separate cell 
within the J-3 staff/NJHQ.45 As tactical units, MJK and HJK are located in Ramsund and 
Rena respectively. It follows from the previous section that unless authority is transferred 
to NJHQ, authority is retained at the strategic level. 
As a rule, resources are allocated to the various units in NAF through the 
respective Service Chief. It is commonly known that the further down the chain a unit is 
located, the more resources are filtered. HJK is directly subordinate to Chief of Army 
Operations.46 In contrast, MJK is two levels below the Commander of Kysteskadren (the 
Navy), who in turn is subordinate to Chief of Naval Operations.47 An organizational 
outline of NORSOF command and control relations is depicted in Figure 5. Kysteskadren 
                                                 
44  Forsvarsdepartementet, Forsvarsdepartementet: Integrert Fra 1. August 2003 [Ministry of defense 
integrated from April 1, 2003] (Oslo,Norway: Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], 2003). 
45  Fellesoperativt hovedkvarter, Forsvarets Operative Ledelse: En Handlekraftig Fellesoperativ 
Ledelse for Nasjonal Sikkerhet Og Internasjonalt Engasjement [An active joint leadership for national 
security and international engagement] (Stavanger, Norway: National Joint Headquarters [National Joint 
Headquarter], p.5 (accessed December 12, 2005). As St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004) also highlights, NJHQ will 
only direct SOF operations when authority is transferred. 
46  Forsvaret, "Hærens Organisering [Army Organization]," Forsvaret [Norwegian Defense], 
http://www.mil.no/haren/start/org/organisering/ (accessed November 10, 2005). 
47  Forsvaret, "Kysteskadren [the Navy]," Forsvaret [Norwegian Defense], 
http://www.mil.no/sjo/keskdr/start/;jsessionid=0Q2TXHWV0BCYLFOUN3NCFEQ?_requestid=8850646 
(accessed November 10, 2005). 
 25
was recently reorganized, but MJK’s organizational location, as depicted in Figure 5, still 
applies for the purposes of this paper. Figure 5 illustrates the potentially uneven location 
of MJK and HJK in terms of resource flow:  HJK has a far better starting point with 
regard to funding than does MJK. Likewise, in practical terms NJHQ has no command 
authority over MJK and HJK.  
 
Figure 5.   National C2 relations 
 
According to AJP-01(B), NATO operations are “planned and executed at three 
levels”48 —military strategic, operational, and tactical. The responsibilities of each level 
are defined in AJP-01(B) in terms of its focus (see Figure 6). 
                                                 
48  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), 2-1. 
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Figure 6.   NATO’s levels of military operations and associated focus (from AJP-
01(B))  
The strategic level deals with campaign objectives, while the operational level 
plans and executes major operations. The tactical level is concerned with individual 
battles and engagements. Figures 4 and 6 both indicate the lack of clear separation 
between the various levels.  
The command structure and associated levels for NATO are illustrated in Figure 
7. The figure is simplified, and only indicates functional names at the appropriate levels. 
Unless operations are led from NATO’s established command structure, a Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) will normally be established to handle individual operations. 
Figure 7 illustrates organizational arrangements for a CJTF. This is the current command 
relationship for NATO’s operation in Afghanistan.49 Depending on its mission, a CJTF 
may or may not have a SO Component Commander (CJSOCC) attached.  
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that in a national context, NORSOF’s level 
of influence is retained at the strategic level. From an operational perspective, conditions 
are favorable for NORSOF as a strategic tool. From a force provider perspective, a 
question can be raised whether resources are allocated appropriately?  HJK is subordinate 
to the Chief of Army Operations, allowing tighter connection to the strategic level within 
the bureaucracy, while MJK is located lower in the bureaucratic hierarchy. A question 
                                                 
49  NATO, "International Security Assistant Force," NATO, 
http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm (accessed November 10, 2005). 
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can therefore be raised with regard to strategic coordination of NORSOF in terms of 
funding and doctrine.  
 
 
Figure 7.   NATO command hierarchy, the Combined Joint Task Force concept,  and 
associated levels 
 
In a NATO context, SOF operations support strategic rather than political 
objectives. This does not exclude SOF from pursuing political objectives when the 
situation dictates. Since NATO in practical terms does not pursue political objectives on 
behalf of individual nations, and since consensus is required for collective action to be 
initiated, strategic SO in peacetime is not likely to be an option. Strategic variables 
determining SOF’s utility are first and foremost found within classic, conventional 
strategy; they are time, space, and force disposition.50 In other words, NATO SOF as a 
collective concept is still dominated by ideas first and foremost associated with Cold War 
conventional strategy.  
                                                 
50  Sverre Diesen, Militær Strategi [Military Strategy], 2nd ed. (Oslo, Norway: J.W.Cappelens Forlag 
AS, 1998), 60. 
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NORSOF thus has two roles with respect to national and NATO utility.  
According to St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004), in a national setting NORSOF can pursue 
political objectives; in a NATO context, it can pursue military objectives.  
 
B. NORSOF: HISTORY AND CURRENT CONTEXT 
This section describes Norwegian special operations from WWII until today to 
provide an unclassified historical context for current roles and missions. Because there is 
no tradition for irregular warfare in a national context prior to WWII, it is the obvious 
starting point. This is not unique to Norway, and some have even argued that SOF is a 
product of the Cold War, an arguable proposition beyond the scope of this thesis.51 
1. World War II 
A short recapitulation of WWII history is not necessary for the purpose of the 
thesis itself, but is included to explain national traditions. The most famous units 
operating in Norway were Company Linge and the Shetland Group. Both units were 
initially created and controlled in the early stage of the war by SOE.  SOE, as a secret 
organization, was authorized in 1940 directly by Churchill “to promote sabotage and 
subversion in enemy occupied territory and to establish a nucleus of trained men tasked 
with assisting indigenous resistance groups.”52 Command of the units later fell under 
national authority as the Norwegian government was reorganized in London. But their 
roles and tasks remained more or less the same throughout the war.  A third group, the 
Partisans of Finnmark, also played a significant SO role during the war. 
Company Linge was initially trained to perform raid operations on the British 
Commando model. The raid force concept was abandoned by the end of 1941, although 
the Company participated in successful raids in Norway. The Company’s founder, Martin 
Linge, was killed in a commando raid at Måløy in December 1941. 
 
51 Richard H. Shultz, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and W. Bradley Stock, eds., Special Operations Forces: 
Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War U.S. Special Operations Command, 1995), 186. See 
also John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham, 
Md: University Press of America, 1996), 360. 
52  "Records of Special Operations Executive," The National Archives, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/DisplayCatalogueDetails.asp?CATID=153&CATLN=1&Ful
lDetails=True (accessed November 15, 2005). 
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Company training was redirected towards irregular warfare with the intent of 
deploying agents to organize, train and equip local resistance groups, or Milorg. The goal 
was to create a unified resistance organization that could support a possible allied 
invasion in Norway, attack communication nodes, conduct sabotage against selected 
targets, protect installations in case of a German retreat, and maintain stability in the 
immediate aftermath of a German capitulation. According to Jens Christian Hauge, who 
commanded Milorg in 1944 and served as Norwegian Minister of Defense from 1945 to 
1952, it was mainly because of Company Linge that Milorg achieved those ambitious 
goals.53 Its most famous operation, often cited as one of the most important strategic 
operations of WWII, was the 1943 attack on the heavy water plant at Rjukan, a location 
presumably crucial for Germany’s nuclear program. 
Throughout the war, 530 operators were trained; 51 were killed in action, and 
seven were captured. Several operators were killed during training, indicating a high level 
of realism in exercises. 
The Shetland Group began as a British attempt to organize and utilize the refugee 
flow across the North Sea after the German occupation. Fishermen and others contributed 
in the evacuation of British soldiers retreating from combat actions in Norway after the 
capitulation in 1940. In November, Maj. L. H. Mitchell went to Shetland to organize this 
activity.54 The intent was to create a sustainable organization that could ferry agents and 
supplies to Norway and return with refugees. Due to heavy fortification of the Norwegian 
coast, clandestine operations were the only viable option for bringing in necessary 
personnel and supplies. The Shetland Group thus became a main effort in shaping the 
various resistance organizations that emerged during the war. 
In 1942, the group’s operations, like Company Linge operations, were 
coordinated with Norwegian authorities. In 1943, the Shetland Group was implemented 
and organized in the Royal Norwegian Navy as a special unit.55 
 
53  Erling Jensen, Per Ratvik and Ragnar Ulstein, eds., Kompani Linge (Vol.1), 2nd ed. (Oslo, Norway: 
LibriArte, 1995), 12-13. 
54  Forsvaret, "KNM Hitra [HNoMS Hitra]," Forsvaret [Norwegian Defense], 
http://www.mil.no/sjo/hos/start/hitra/ (accessed March 16, 2005). 
55  Forsvaret, "KNM Hitra [HNoMS Hitra]" 
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The Shetland Group was also involved in offensive operations. In 1942, Capt. 
Larsen, the most notable group member, towed two Chariots (two-man torpedoes) with 
his fishing vessel across the North Sea into Trondheimsfjorden in an attempt to attack the 
German battleship Tirpitz. A severe storm made one of the Chariots break loose, and the 
mission was aborted before the attack could be initiated.56 The Shetland Group was later 
issued US submarine chasers which radically improved their operational capability.  
Due to the high risk mission profile and harsh winter weather in the North Sea, 
the Shetland Group suffered heavy losses throughout the war. During the winter of 
1942/43, German counter-operations sank several vessels, leaving 33 dead. The largest 
individual loss occurred in November 1941, when the vessel Blia disappeared along with 
43 people.57  
A third group, the Partisans of Finnmark, was organized and trained by the Soviet 
secret police NKVD (precursor to the KGB) and the Soviet Northern Fleet. Although 
minor operations had already commenced in late 1940, the term “partisan” in this context 
normally refers to Norwegian personnel working for the Soviet Union between 1941 and 
1944, after the German invasion of Norway in 1941.58 Partisan activity was focused on 
operations in Troms and Finnmark County, the two northernmost counties of Norway.   
The Soviets never coordinated partisan activity with Norwegian authorities as did 
the groups organized by the British. Instead, partisans were on occasions forced to sign a 
lifelong oath of allegiance for the Soviet Union. Implicit in the oath were threats of 
punishment if this connection was ever revealed. The partisans’ war efforts were thus 
never appreciated. Partisans were instead investigated after the war on suspicion of 
continuing to work for the Soviet intelligence. Their war efforts, however, were 
significant to the Soviet strategy of relieving German pressure against the Soviet 14th 
Army at the Litsa-front.59 As such, their operations are interesting in a SO perspective. 
 
56  Sven U. Larsen, "Shetlandsgjengen," Norgeslexi, 
http://lotus.uib.no/norgeslexi/krigslex/s/s3.html#shetlandsgjengen (accessed March 16, 2005). 
57  Ibid. 
58  Tønne Huitfeldt, De Norske Partisanene i Finnmark 1941-1944: I Skyggen Av Den Kalde Krigen 
[Norwegian Partisans in Finnmark 1941-1944: In the shadows of the Cold War] (Oslo, Norway: Institutt 
for Forsvarsstudier, 1997), 5.  
59 Huitfeldt, De Norske Partisanene i Finnmark 1941-1944, 17. 
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Partisan missions focused on strategic reconnaissance (SR) against German 
shipping, establishing agent nets, and target acquisition on German base structure. The 
area of operation, located 1000 kilometers north of the Artic Circle, was sparsely 
populated, with very little vegetation, which made operations extremely vulnerable to 
detection. Insertions could generally not be made during summer due to 24 hour daylight, 
and winter weather was harsh, making insertions, whether by submarine or airdrops, 
difficult.   
Early attempts to establish and run local agent nets or partisan groups were 
quickly discovered by German counter-intelligence, mainly due to the transparency of the 
communities. The Soviets thus concluded that permanent partisan warfare was not 
possible.60  
Strategic reconnaissance teams were initially more successful. Deployed at 
isolated locations on the coast, teams normally consisted of three operators; a mission 
lasted at least six months. Strategic reconnaissance missions contributed to the Soviet 
success in disrupting German naval supply lines established to support the 70,000 strong 
German presence in Finnmark and Northern Finland.61 
Target acquisition on German air bases, fuel dumps, fortifications, etc., in vital 
areas enhanced the effectiveness of Soviet Air Force raids. In an early phase of the war,  
the Germans did not link the increasingly large number of sunken ships and the exact 
targeting of military installations to enemy activity. When this connection became 
evident in late 1942, German counter-intelligence initiated a series of counter-operations. 
Through two operations, Mitternachtsonne and Tundra, major portions of the partisan 
activity in Eastern Finnmark were uncovered.62  
The exact number of partisans explicitly trained and used in operations is not 
known for certain; estimates suggest approximately 75 people. Partisan losses were more 
severe than for other groups. Ragnar Ulstein estimates 35 were killed or executed and 
refugees and captives brought the total loss  close to 100 percent.63  
 
60  Huitfeldt, De Norske Partisanene i Finnmark 1941-1944, 7. 
61  Ibid., 6-7. 
62  Ibid., 11-13. 
63 Ibid., 5. 
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All three groups conducted irregular or special operations more or less throughout 
the war. Personnel were specially trained and equipped for small unit tactics behind 
enemy lines. The groups supported strategic or operational objectives whether through 
reconnaissance, direct action or unconventional warfare. Current definitions of SO thus 
apply to these groups.  
The major difference between WWII and contemporary operations is that WWII 
groups operated behind enemy lines within their own country. This does certainly not 
make their war effort less important, sacrificing, or heroic. But although Partisan 
operations in Finnmark were hampered by societal transparency, in general cultural 
differences were clearly not a problem. History illustrates there is at least a national 
tradition, albeit a short one, on the conduct of special operations in war. More 
importantly, the modus operandi of these groups set the pattern for subsequent thinking 
about special operations in Norway.  
2. The Cold War 
After WWII, special purpose units were disbanded, and their personnel were 
either dismissed or joined the conventional military as it was reconstructed. This process 
was not unique to Norway. To some degree, it reflects the status of special groups and 
their roles in warfare. Special operations as a national capability was not considered part 
of the new security environment.  
The origins of MJK and HJK can be traced back to the early 1950’s and 1960’s. 
Both were organized under conventional military command within their respective 
services. The degree to which their creation was based on strategic or operational 
requirements, or resulted from enthusiastic insiders’ bottom-up approach from is subject 
to debate.  The latter is probably closer to the truth than the former. 
Hærens Fallskjermjegerskole (HFJS), the origin of today’s HJK, was established 
in 1962 as a school unit to train conventional Army reconnaissance units in parachute 
insertion techniques. In 1966 and 1967, the school started educating its own 
fallskjermjegertropp, a platoon-size paratrooper unit designed for reconnaissance and 
sabotage in the enemy’s rear, an area beyond the scope of conventional Army units. The 
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main body of its personnel consisted of conscripts serving a mandatory year of military 
service. At the same time, the school changed its name to Hærens Jegerskole (HJS).64  
Marinejegerlaget (MJL) was formally established in 1968, although its origins are 
older. The National Intelligence Service (NIS), strongly inspired by Italian and British 
successes during WWII with underwater attacks, asked the Navy in the early 1950’s to 
establish a diving school. With NIS financial support, the first class of froskemenn, 
frogmen, was ready to be examined in 1953.65 Training was based on a model adopted 
from the U.S. Underwater Demolition Teams, and its purpose was to develop “perfect 
saboteurs and underwater warriors.”66  
As their tasks grew to include a mixture of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 
deep-diving, rescue-diving and so forth, a decision was made to disband the frogman 
organization and create two new units. The new organization was established in 1968. 
Tasks categorized as offensive were assigned to Marinejegerlaget, and those defined as 
defensive to Minedykkertroppen (EOD). The MJL tasks were sabotage against ships and 
harbor installations, reconnaissance, raids, and the conduct of special operations at the 
joint level.67 
Part of MJL’s education involved parachute insertion techniques. Cooperation 
with HFJS had been initiated in 1965 for the parachute education of frogmen. The 
operational concept was to drop personnel close to ships or harbor installations, have 
them conduct the raid, and extract them with the assistance of paratroopers located 
onshore. As the new organization emerged, a decision was made to enlist most MJL 
personnel, mainly for safety reasons. The training was assumed to be too dangerous to be 
left to conscripts.68 
 
64  HJK, "Hærens Jegerkommando [Norwegian Army Special Operations Commando]," Norwegian 
Defense, http://www.mil.no/haren/hjk/start/Generelt/ (accessed March 15, 2005). 
65  Erling Krange, Fra Marinedykkingens Historie i Norge [History of Norwegian Naval Diving] 
(Kristiansand, Norge: Erkra Forlag, 1994), 99. 
66  Ibid., 102 The quote is a translation of “perfekte sabotører og undervannskrigere.” 
67  Ibid., 133 . According to Krange, one task was to “cooperate with other services in executing 
special operations,” in this paper understood as operational-level tasks. 
68  Krange, Fra Marinedykkingens Historie i Norge, 135. 
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In 1978, the Government ordered Department of Defense to establish a 
professional counterterrorism (CT) capability aimed at assisting the police in case of 
terror attacks against the oil infrastructure in the North Sea.69 Jurisdiction on the 
continental shelf was and still is retained by Ministry of Justice and Police. The Army 
was tasked to establish this capability. Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) was 
established as part of HJS to support this task. The unit was declared operational in 
1984.70  
The decision to assign a maritime task to the Army might have altered an 
established division of roles between MJL and HJS. According to Berglund, the creation 
of FSK implied that HJS had to focus on two principal tasks: the 12 month training of the 
conscripted paratrooper, and training for offshore CT, the latter being the most 
challenging. Due to the focus on CT, HJS was unable to fill its traditional SOF role 
because the paratroopers were only capable of conducting limited SO missions. However, 
MJL, already partly professionalized and not involved in offshore operations, broadened 
its range of traditional littoral tasks to include land-based operations. Consequently, both 
units “have acquired expertise and tasks that naturally should have been in the other SOF 
unit’s domain.”71 
The distinction between traditional land and naval roles became blurred. During 
the Cold War, this paradox never became apparent, nor was it disputed. Yet MJL focused 
its training on operations in the littoral in support of naval operations, while HJS focused 
on training its paratrooper unit in support of land operations. It is not obvious to what 
degree tactics, techniques, and procedures differed in the execution phase of a mission. 
Both units have thus possessed overlapping capabilities since they were established. It is 
 
69  Justis- og politidepartementet, St.Meld.39 (2003-2004) Samfunnssikkerhet Og Sivilt-Militært 
Samarbeid [Societal security and civil-military cooperation] (Oslo,Norway: Justis- og politidepartementet 
[Ministry of Justice and Police], 2004), para 5.1.4 (accessed January 12, 2006). 
70  Frode Danielsen, "An Asset: The Special Forces," Norwegian Defense, 
http://www.mil.no/languages/english/start/article.jhtml?sourceID=161791&source=ftd (accessed March 15, 
2005). 
71  Jan Berglund, "The Possible Merger of Norwegian Special Forces - an Assessment of Key 
Factors," (Term paper for MN 3121, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2002). Berglund has 
previous operational experience in MJL and HJS/FSK; he served as MJK commanding officer from 1993 to 
1996. 
 36
                                                
the environment defined by the maritime or the land domain respectively, that 
traditionally have distinguished MJK and HJS. 
In terms of resource allocation, both units were subordinated to the equivalent of 
today’s Service Chief. Command and control went through a SOF cell located in the Joint 
Staff at one of the two regional headquarters.72 During the latter part of the Cold War, the 
Norwegian defense structure included two operational headquarters: DEFCOMNON 
located in Bodø, and DEFCOMSONOR located in Stavanger. Briefly, DEFCOMNON 
had operational control of units operating in the northern part of Norway, while 
DEFCOMSONOR had the equivalent responsibility in the south.73 On a daily basis, C2 
was retained principally through a SOF staff officer assigned the Joint OPS (See Figure 
8). Due to low manning, MJL and HJS augmented the operational level headquarters 
during exercises. This arrangement was generally retained until 2003, when the current 
command structure, which involved merging the regional HQs, was implemented. 
The Cold War roles and missions of NORSOF were thus focused on strategic 
intelligence and raids in the enemy rear, principally on national territory. NATO’s role 
has always been defense of its own territory or restoration of a pre-war status quo. The 
resemblance to strategy and tactics used in WWII operations is obvious. The other 
principal role was the offshore CT mission, retained by HJS.   
 
 
72 Practical arrangements, including the name of the cell, changed over time.  
73 Forces physically located south of the 65 parallel were operationally controlled by DEFCOMSO. 
When operating north of the parallel, forces changed command to DEFCOMNON. Air assets were 
controlled by CAOC 3, located at DEFCOMNON, regardless of physical location in national airspace. 
 
Figure 8.   Cold War principal C2 arrangements 
 
3. Post Cold War to the Present 
The end of the Cold War implied changing the traditional roles of both NAF and 
NATO. Domestically, the debate focused on the relevance of a continuous strategy based 
on territorial defense. It is clear that throughout the 1990’s, the military did not transform 
in accordance with political intentions. This is one reason given for the imbalance in the 
defense structure as set forth in St.prp.nr.45 (2000-2001). It is also clear that the end of 
the Cold War caused cuts in defense budgets. In the 1990’s, NORSOF was spared while 
other units or capabilities were disbanded. The MJL had traditionally not been an 
expensive capability due to its small organization, low technological requirements, and 
unique capabilities within the Navy. This explains why MJL was sustained as a 
capability. The HJS CT role represented a unique capability within the military 
organization, which most likely explains why HJS was sustained. 
In 1991MJL was renamed to Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), and in 1997 HJS 
was changed to Hærens Jegerkommando (HJK). The term NORSOF was first used when 
both units deployed to Afghanistan in 2001/2002 in support of Operation Enduring 
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Freedom (OEF), and is now a common term for the two units. It has no organizational 
meaning and merely serves as a common denominator. 
From official sources, very little information is revealed on contemporary 
operations or the forces involved.74 What is known, though, is that both MJK and HJK 
participated in NATO operations in the Balkan conflicts,75 and HJK claim on their 
official home page to be deployed more or less continuously to international operations 
since 1996.76 It is through recent operations in support of OEF that NORSOF has 
received the most attention. While deployments to the Balkan theater occurred after 
peace negotiations were formally declared and initiated, Afghanistan was in a state of war 
when NORSOF deployed in late 2001. Personnel from MJK and HJK have been 
recognized by US authorities for their contributions.77  
The post-Cold War era thus increased the focus on international operations. For 
NORSOF, this trend was not obvious, although Norway has a long tradition of UN 
operations.78 Magne Rødahl, former Executive Officer at HJK, claimed as late as 1998 
that it was time to re-evaluate the type of forces Norway normally contributes to 
international peace operations, and to explore NORSOF’s potential in such operations.79 
There were several reasons for Rødahl’s claim. Prior to the Balkan Wars, Norwegian 
force contributions to international operations mainly consisted of volunteer units, stood 
up and designed for a specific mission. Standing units, designed for national defense, 
were not deployed collectively. The volunteer units were generally not given combat 
roles. An argument can be made that a combat role was inconsistent with national 
 
74  Danielsen, An Asset: The Special Forces. 
75  Per Fr I. Pharo, Norge på Balkan 1990-1999 [Norwegian participation in the Balkans 1990-1999] 
(Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2000), 7. 
76  HJK, Hærens Jegerkommando [Norwegian Army Special Operations Commando]. Norwegian 
Defense, http://www.mil.no/haren/hjk/start/Generelt/ (accessed March 15, 2005). 
77  Ole K. Eide, "Special Forces Acknowledged," Norwegian Defense, 
http://www.mil.no/languages/english/start/article.jhtml?articleID=94268 (accessed March 18, 2005). 
78  Ulf Andenæs, "Internasjonal Innsats Forsvarets Nye Mål:'Ola Soldat' Går Utenriks [International 
Operations the New Modus Operandi for the Armed Forces]," Aftenposten, 
http://tux1.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/d192352.htm#bakgrunn (accessed December 12, 2005). 
79  Magne Rødahl and Erik Dokken, "Norske Spesialstyrker i Fremtidige Internasjonale 
Fredsoperasjoner Operasjoner [Norwegian Special Operation Forces in Future International Peace 
Operations]," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, no. 10 (1998), 5. 
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diplomatic as well as military traditions, because Norway has traditionally focused its 
international role as a peace broker. As a small nation, Norway sought solutions to 
conflicts through diplomacy. The NAF has thus been assigned a defensive role, and has 
traditionally been considered a last resort option for national defense. NORSOF 
deployment to the Balkan theater represented a break with existing traditions in the sense 
that standing units were deployed. A national “lessons learned” seminar covering NAF’s 
involvement in the Balkan Wars concluded that NORSOF capabilities should increase 
due to the flexibility and versatility of the units themselves along with international 
recognition of their job.80  
Although little is publicly released on international operations, a fair assumption 
is that NORSOF has been utilized within its traditional roles, which are part of direct 
action operations. There is nothing indicating NORSOF participated with indirect 
capabilities. Since October 2001, OEF has focused on manhunt operations, implying  that 
direct action rather than indirect capabilities are being utilized. Sean Naylor, senior 
reporter for the US Army Times, claims that coalition SOF, with the exception of the 
Australian SAS, did not bring sufficient capabilities in an early phase of OEF to act in 
anything other than a reconnaissance role. Hence NATO SOF’s role in Operation 
Anaconda in February 2002 was operationally limited.81  
Domestically, HJK still retains the offshore counterterrorist role. Although HJK 
claims FSK is standing by for onshore operations as well, this claim is contested. HJK 
obviously has the capability, but the legal ramifications for military support to police 
operations are restrictive. A basic condition for military support to police operations is 
that the police must lack personnel or equipment for a particular operation.82 Military 
support is thus generally considered on a case-by-case basis. While national police only 
have limited capabilities offshore, they maintain the full responsibility for onshore 
 
80 Lessons Learned seminar for politicians, officers, academics, and high ranking civil servants, April 
2000, coordinated by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, the Norwegian Staff College, and the 
National Defence College. 
81  Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: 
Berkley Books, 2005), 425. 
82  Justis- og politidepartementet, St.Meld.39 (2003-2004) Samfunnssikkerhet Og Sivilt-Militært 
Samarbeid [Societal securiy and civil-military cooperation], ch. 4.2. 
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counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, as long as FSK is on standby for offshore 
missions, it represents an option for onshore operations should the situation demand it.   
Likewise, MJK is used domestically in support of Naval and Coast Guard 
operations, exemplified in the October 2005 Elektron incident. During an inspection by 
the Coast Guard, the skipper of a Russian trawler, Elektron, decided to run for Russian 
territorial waters with two inspectors still on board. According to Rear Admiral Grytting, 
only bad weather prevented the use of force to stop the vessel.83 The inspectors were 
released when Elektron eventually reached Russian territorial waters. 
In support of Berglund’s assertion, the question whether MJK and HJK share the 
same roles and missions is arguably a result of two seemingly contradictions: Both units 
deployed during the Balkan Wars and Afghanistan, two landlocked theaters, and both 
units are used domestically, arguably in a counterterrorism role.  
Naylor raises the first contradiction as an issue in regard to the American use of 
Navy SEALs in OEF. His anonymous sources claim that SEALs had no role in a land 
warfare scenario. Rather, this is the domain of Army SF.84 However, there is no historical 
precedence for this claim. Navy personnel or units have on occasion successfully 
contributed in irregular operations outside the Navy’s traditional areas of operation.85  
A significant difference between Army and Navy SOF units is the environment 
where their activity normally takes place. This can be called the unit’s niche, and could 
be illustrated by the US division of roles. Land operations normally fall within the land 
component commander’s domain; hence support to Army operations is traditionally the 
responsibility for the US Army’s Special Forces. The same applies for the Navy SEALs 
and support to naval operations.  
However, as part of the Army, USSF was initially tasked to conduct irregular 
operations in Eastern Europe in case the Cold War went hot, and later to act in a 
counterinsurgency role in Vietnam. The USSF’s modus operandi was focused on its 
 
83  Sveinung B. Bentzrød, "Marinejegere Fløyet Ut [MJK Deployed]," Aftenposten, 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article1137707.ece (accessed 9 November, 2005). 
84  Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die. 
85  Milton E. Miles, "Chinese Pirates and the SACO Dragon" in From Troy to Entebbe: Special 
Operations in Ancient and Modern Times, ed. John Arquilla (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1996), 288-311. 
indirect capabilities or unconventional warfare (UW) role. The primary mission was to 
establish resistance groups (guerrilla warfare in Eastern Europe) or population control 
(counterinsurgency in Vietnam).86 The USSF retained an offensive capability, partly 
because this is a component of any small unit’s tactical requirements, and partly because 
training indigenous forces required this knowledge. Cultural knowledge and linguistic 
capabilities however, are the primary focus for those working with local populations, 
whether they be guerrillas or civilians. The focus of is on developing indirect capabilities.  
For the SEALs, the traditional support for naval operations emphasized maritime 
capabilities. Operating in the littoral for intelligence or raiding purposes, or supporting 
the Navy with maritime interdiction capabilities for embargo operations, requires direct 
action capabilities. Diving, especially combat diving, is equally embedded in the 
maritime environment. The counterinsurgency or guerrilla role is thus not the primary 
focus.  Navy SEALs can act in an advisory role, but since this is not their principal role, 
such missions are primarily assigned USSF. Both USSF and the SEALs have technical 
capabilities within each other’s domain, which might seem odd from a transformation 
perspective. The key to understanding this redundancy in capabilities is that both must 
have small unit tactics capabilities in order to perform their primary missions. Figure 9, 
derived from Adams, illustrates this contradiction.87   
 
 
Figure 9.   SOF redundancy in terms of capabilities 
 
                                                 
86  Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998). 
87  Ibid., 16. 
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Counterterrorism is regarded as a highly specialized form of direct action. Due to 
the level of perfection required in hostage rescue operations (HR), the US has established 
separate units to fill this role, the Army Delta Force and the Navy SEAL Team Six.88 
Whether it is relevant to compare the US structure with Norwegian requirements can be 
argued. But this illustrates that different SOF units fill different niches, by nature 
implying redundant capabilities. In the US structure, however, primary roles and missions 
are clearly divided among the various SOF units.  
The second contradiction is that MJK and HJK both conduct CT operations.  This 
could seem odd. Although national CT readiness is HJK’s domain, MJK at least shares a 
similar capability through its focus on Maritime Interdict Operations (MIO).89 
Traditionally, MIO is part of Naval SOF units’ tactical support to maritime operations, 
and the recent deployment for the Elektron incident must be viewed as a function of 
MJK’s MIO capability.90 Whether this was a CT operation can be debated. Why the 
military decided to deploy MJK instead of HJK for the Elektron incident at least 
illustrates that roles and missions are not clearly defined or separated, even with regard to 
the CT role. 
It can thus be argued that NORSOF traditionally has focused on direct action 
rather than indirect action capabilities. The question, however, is whether this is 
sufficient or desirable for the future.  
 
C. SUMMARY 
History and recent practice both indicate that NORSOF’s traditional roles and 
missions continue to be within the direct action spectrum of special operations, or 
strategic reconnaissance and direct action as defined in current doctrine. Both SR and DA 
are referred to as direct action capabilities in this paper, as both are intended to bring 
force directly to the enemy. These roles are shaped by the Cold War paradigm. During 
 
88  Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 160-167. 
89  Kysteskadren, Det Nye Sjøforsvaret: Omstilling i Sjøforsvaret 2004-2010 [Changing the Navy 
2004-2010] (Bergen, Norway: Kysteskadren, 2005), 5. 
90  Bentzrød, Marinejegere Fløyet Ut [MJK Deployed]. 
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the Cold War, NORSOF represented a service-based joint capability and thus was an 
operational asset for the pursuit of strategic objectives.  
Throughout the Cold War it seems that MJL and HJS had similar or overlapping 
tasks. Each focused, however, on the environment as defined by their parent service:  
MJL operated in the littorals and HJS inland. Thus both units represented a service-based 
capability. The environment was then and remains now an important part of their internal 
niche; it represents an important component of their joint roles. The two organizations, 
MJL and HJS, had overlapping tasks insofar as both conducted strategic intelligence and 
direct action missions. 
HJS was assigned a domestic offshore CT role in 1981, thus bringing a new 
capability to the military. The CT role is a supporting role to Department of Justice and 
Police. Introducing the CT role arguably altered the established land/naval distinction 
between MJL and HJS. While MJL expanded its missions to include operations beyond 
the littoral area, HJS concentrated its focus on CT. 
 The NORSOF international deployments began when the Balkan Wars started in 
the 1990’s. Lessons learned from the Balkan Wars suggested a further expansion of 
NORSOF’s capabilities, regardless of the costs involved. To a certain extent, this 
expansion is already complete, as HJK has been able to deploy internationally since 1996 
while retaining its domestic CT role. According to Berglund, HJK did not have this 
capability before 1990. Likewise, MJK has expanded to manage its deployments. The 
degree to which MJL had this capability prior to 1990 is unclear.  
It is through recent deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom that 
NORSOF has gained the most public attention. The issue of overlapping roles is arguably 
fuelled by the fact that both Afghanistan and the Balkans are landlocked theaters. A 
question then arises:  Why does Norway need both a Navy and an Army SOF capability?  
This is the question underlying this thesis. This thesis suggests that there is no 
contradiction in the overlap because the environment is the niche where one unit has 
certain advantages over the other. As current international practice illustrates, a degree of 
overlap between units should be considered a strength rather than weakness.  
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Recent deployments indicate that NORSOF has deployed as an operational level 
asset supporting operational or strategic level objectives. This is also consistent with 
national and NATO doctrine. Yet, NORSOF has a strategic role in a national context as 
stated in St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004). This paper claims that existing doctrine does not cover 
this expanded role, and suggests a new definition. Thus NORSOF can be seen as having 
two roles: a strategic role in support of national foreign policy objectives, and an 
operational role supporting strategic campaign objectives. NORSOF’s strategic role in 












                                                
III. THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, FUTURE THREATS, 
AND NEW STRATEGIES 
This chapter looks at the current security environment and strategy for dealing 
with current threats. The chapter answers these questions: What is the nature of the 
security environment and perceived future threats? What are the national strategies 
available to deal with the new environment? 
A common framework for assessing future challenges for NAF is considering the 
type (conventional and asymmetric) and location (national or international) of potential 
conflicts.91 Whether types of conflicts are best understood within a conventional/ 
asymmetric framework is debatable. Based on recent experiences from Afghanistan and 
Iraq, a likely scenario is that future conflicts maintain both types, more or less at the same 
time. The location of future conflicts and the implications for NAF have been more 
prevalent as considerations in the national defense debate. Simply put, should NAF 
prepare for national or international tasks? While there might be dissent to the answer 
depending who is asked, most concur that NAF alone cannot deter or prevent an invasion 
of Norwegian territory. The crux of the discussion is the extent to which Norway can 
expect sufficient military and political support from its international partners, 
predominantly through NATO. 
 
A. A NEW DEFINITION OF SECURITY? 
The end of the Cold War altered the existing concept of security, a concept that 
since WWII had been more or less exclusively focused on state security, or state 
survival.92 Recently, the concept of societal security has increased in importance. 
“Societal security concerns the safeguarding of the population and the protection of key 
societal functions and important infrastructure against attack and other kinds of damage, 
in situations in which the existence of the state as such is not threatened.”93 Terrorism 
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and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are regarded as the gravest 
threats to societal security. Although due to its domestic nature, societal security is 
mainly the concern of civilian leaders and police forces, NAF must be prepared “to 
contribute when needed.”94 In addition, human security, i.e. “protecting the individual 
with regards to human rights…”95 has become increasingly important. Humanitarian 
concerns have been the direct objective of several interventions since the Cold War, 
including Somalia in 1992 and Kosovo in 1999. 
An expanded security concept has “major significance for the tasks that military 
forces might be asked to carry out, and therefore also for training, equipment and 
operational concepts of NAF.”96 Although the requirements of security have changed, the 
fundamental focus remains on state security and national survival. With the absence of a 
clear and present danger, the fundamental question then becomes how best to secure the 
state’s interest.  
The Ministry of Defense in 2004 issued its strategic concept Relevant Force, 
stating the following objectives for Norwegian security policy:97 
1. Prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to Norwegian 
and collective security 
2. Contribute to peace, stability and the further development of the 
international rule of law  
3. Uphold Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights and interests, and protect 
Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military and other 
kinds of pressure  
4. Defend, together with our allies, Norway and NATO against assault and 
attack 
5. Protect society against assault and attack from state and non-state actors. 
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According to Relevant Force, the military must prepare for eight specific tasks to 
achieve these objectives. These tasks are divided in three categories. “National tasks” are 
solved without Alliance support. “Tasks carried out in cooperation with allies and 
possibly others” imply coalition operations, preferably through NATO. “Other tasks” are 
supporting tasks to departments other than Ministry of Defense. The specific tasks are98 
National tasks 
1.  Ensure a national basis for decision-making through timely surveillance and 
intelligence gathering. 
2.  Exercise Norwegian sovereignty. 
3.  Exercise authority in defined areas. 
4.  Prevent and handle security-related incidents and crises in Norway and in 
areas under Norwegian jurisdiction. 
Tasks carried out in cooperation with allies and possibly others 
5.  Contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other parts of NATO 
against threats, assaults and attacks, including the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
6.  Contribute to multinational crisis management, including multinational 
peace operations. 
Other tasks 
7.  Provide military support to diplomacy and to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
8.  Contribute to the safeguarding of societal security and other vital societal 
tasks. 
While at first glance both objectives for security policy and tasks to the military 
might seem reasonable, neither, with the possible exception of framing tasks as national 
or Alliance-specific, gives significant substance to NORSOF specific roles and missions.  
 
B. THE NATURE OF THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Much is said about the new security environment. This section reviews only the 
most important features with regard to its implications for Norway. This analysis is 
undertaken in light of the expanded view on national security as outlined in Chapter I, 
 
98  Forsvarsdepartementet, Relevant Force, 61-66. 
and includes state security, societal security, and human security. The analysis uses the 
framing of tasks as either national or Alliance driven.  
1. The National Context  
The conclusion of the Cold War ended an era where a single threat determined 
NAF’s roles and missions. Although Russia still maintains a substantial military presence 
in and around the Kola Peninsula, its political intentions have changed. The pleasant 
implication is that the current threat of conventional war is negligible, at least in the 
short-term.99 
Although conventional war is less likely, Norway still has unsolved jurisdictional 
and territorial disputes within its vast maritime economic zone. Figure 10 depicts 
Norway’s economic zone (NEZ), which is seven times Norway’s land mass. More than 
70 percent of national revenues are extracted from activities in NEZ, and more than 80 
percent of national import and export are shipped through the NEZ.100 To secure free 
access, not only to NEZ, but to the high seas in general, is therefore a vital national 
interest. 
  
Figure 10.   Norwegian economic zones (NEZ. (from St.prp.nr. 42 (2003-2004)) 
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Sovereignty in the Barents region, however, has been contested since the 
1950’s.101 Economically, the Barents region is increasingly important due to increased 
petroleum exploration. Although the sovereignty dispute most likely will lead to nothing 
more than a diplomatic tug of war, a satisfactory agreement has so far proven impossible. 
Several arrests of Russian and EU vessels fishing illegally in disputed areas around 
Spitzbergen and Bjørnøya in late 2005, along with the more dramatic Elektron incident, 
illustrate this area’s potential to ignite a more serious crisis. Willy Østreng, Director of 
the Centre for Advanced Studies in Oslo, asserts that these incidents have the clear 
potential to set back political relations between Russia and Norway. Maintaining a firm 
yet credible policy with regard to jurisdiction in this region is therefore essential.102  
On the mainland, Norway shares a border with Russia. the Army has national 
responsibility for surveillance and control of the remote parts of the shared border. This 
mission is executed on behalf of the Department for Justice and Police. The Army is 
issued limited police jurisdiction, as is the Coast Guard in NEZ, so it might quickly 
respond to border violations. The principal threats to this border are activities related to 
organized crime.103 Since the border runs through a relatively isolated area, the 
possibility of terrorists using this route to pass from east to west cannot be excluded.  
2. The Global Context 
International terrorism and local/ regional wars are presently assessed as more 
likely threats than conventional war.104 Societal security is thus challenged more than 
state security. Apart from the global terror networks like Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, 
weak or failed states, and WMD proliferation, these threats are not sufficiently 
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understood. Globalization has made national economies increasingly dependent on 
international stability; hence it is a national interest to promote peace, stability, and 
democracy in troubled regions.105 This somewhat vague description of threats illustrates 
the complexity of today’s threat environment.  
Although the threats can be difficult to operationalize, some more prevalent trends 
describe the changing nature of conflicts. One such change is the rise of global terrorism 
and non-state actors who can inflict damage previously only possible from nation states. 
Terrorism in itself is not a new phenomenon. What is new is a seemingly increased 
fanaticism “determined to inflict maximum civilian and economic damages on distant 
targets in pursuit of…extremist goals.”106 What is generally expected is that this new 
wave of terrorism, led by Al Qaeda, will be willing to use WMDs to promote their cause. 
It is unnecessary to document their potential to wreak havoc, which is most clearly 
demonstrated by the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. in 2001.  
Another trend is that intra-state conflicts increasingly have regional or global 
ramifications or spillover effects. The ongoing war on terror is illustrative. Weak or failed 
states like Afghanistan and Pakistan are the most likely harbingers of international 
terrorism. Although Pakistan plays a crucial role in the war on terrorism, its political and 
military control in Waziristan, a border region to Afghanistan, is seriously questioned.107 
The same argument can be used for weak or failed states or regions on the African 
continent where government functions are absent. 
Norway and Norwegian interests have so far not been directly targeted by this 
new wave of terrorism. There are several reasons why this might be the case. The relative 
size of the Norwegian population compared to e.g., Spain or Great Britain, makes society 
itself more transparent. Likewise, having a smaller immigration community than Madrid 
and London allows for better control with potential radicalization within these groups. 
Norwegian foreign policy has also traditionally focused on promoting respect for 
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international law based on justice and diplomacy rather than power. Norway in 1904 was 
entrusted with the authority to award the Nobel Peace Prize, further indicating the 
nation’s history of peaceful intentions.108 Thus, the perception of Norway as a peaceful 
nation without harmful foreign policy agendas might have an impact on potential 
terrorists. 
Nonetheless, Jørn Holme, head of the Norwegian Police Security Service, claims 
it is just a matter of time before Scandinavia is hit by an attack. According to Holme, 
Norway is currently used as a safe haven by terrorists planning operations in Europe. 
Norway in the future could be regarded as a soft target due to its liberal society, making it 
easier to attack than cities like London or Madrid.109 In addition, Norway is a strategic 
energy partner for several European countries, which might lead to terrorism on 
Norwegian soil for strategic purposes. Lastly, Norway has participated with troops in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether a UN resolution was the premise for military support 
is probably irrelevant to a terrorist. To assume Norway is safe from international 
terrorism is not prudent. 
A third trend might be that conflicts have increasingly shifted from conventional, 
interstate wars towards intrastate conflicts or civil wars. Between 1946 and 1955, the 
ratio between these types of conflict was approximately equal. Between 1996 and 2000, 
the ratio shifted to 1:20, while the number of conflicts has remained unchanged. 
Likewise, the relationship between civilian and military casualties has shifted from 1:8 to 
8:1 over the last 100 years.110 The rise in the targeting of civilians indicates that war has 
become more political in nature. The trend is toward disputes over who shall rule rather 
than what shall be ruled. The shift from conventional wars towards “other” wars has led 
to new terms like low intensity conflict (LIC), military operations other than war, Crisis 
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Response Operations (CRO) and the like. The current conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq 
both exemplify LIC, which is normally defined as a protracted conflict between a state 
and non- state actors.111 
3. National Interests 
From the above analysis it is clear that with the exception of threats to state 
security, Norway’s national interests are connected to the maritime environment in 
general and the Norwegian Economic Zone (NEZ) in particular. Globally, national 
interests are connected to international stability, which Norway cannot provide on its 
own. Collective security is thus a keyword.  
Relevant Force states that  
protection of the environment, welfare and economic security is…a 
fundamental security interest for Norway….Norwegian security interests 
thus comprise challenges that might threaten international law, human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law, economic security, and the 
environment.112  
It can thus be concluded that it is in the nation’s interest to protect and defend these 
values. 
Relevant Force further emphasizes NEZ’s relevance for the national economy. 
Protection of the petroleum infrastructure is deemed particularly vital, not only by 
national authorities, but also for existing customers. “The same is the case for 
international regulations and principles connected to the freedom of the seas and the 
management of resources in the oceans.”113  
National security is closely connected to Euro-Atlantic security. Promoting 
“democracy in regions adjacent to Europe”114 is therefore deemed a national security 
interest. Norway cannot do this by itself. Collective measures, primarily through NATO, 
thus become important to this objective. It is a national interest to create conditions 
 
111  Bjørn Marcusson, "Kärt Barn Har Många Namn? Lågintensiva Konflikter Och De 
Militärteoretiska Klassikerna [Low- Intensity Conflicts and Military Theory]" in En Ny Medeltid? En 
Introduksjon i Lågintensiva Konflikter [Introduction to Low- Intensity Conflicts], eds. Arne Baudin, 
Thomas Hagman and Jan Ångström (Stockholm, Sweden: Försvarshögskolan, 2002), 62. 
112  Forsvarsdepartementet, Relevant Force, 17-18. 
113  Ibid., 18. 
114  Ibid. 
 53
                                                
favorable for collective security. The same argument applies to the UN’s role as the 
transnational organ promoting international law. 
The above discussion indicates that national interests are closely tied to the 
concept of security, where it must be assumed that national security is ranked higher than 
societal security, which in turn is ranked higher than human security. Accepting that 
Norway alone cannot defend its national interests in a hostile environment, a coherent 
alliance affiliation is the primary goal for national security. Defending national interests 
connected to the maritime environment, with emphasis on the NEZ, will be the next 
priority, along with societal security. Promoting democracy outside Europe is thus 
deemed less important than maintaining the national economy and national survival. 
 
C. A CHANGED STRATEGY: COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 
It is one thing is to identify security challenges; it is quite another to create a 
coherent response strategy. As a small nation, Norway has a traditional policy of solving 
international disputes through diplomacy. For state survival, since WWII the national 
strategic plan has depended on NATO affiliation. A coherent defense alliance, however, 
requires a common identified threat or common foreign political goals to justify its 
existence. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat was sufficient for the European 
community to act as a coherent unity. This might no longer be the case.  
According to Neumann, a serious impediment to creating a coherent Norwegian 
strategic plan has been the lack of a national strategic concept. Since Neumann made his 
claim in 2002, Relevant Force has been developed to fill this gap. Yet, as Neumann 
claims, the next step is to “concretize and formulate a national security strategy…and 
align military doctrines in accordance with the strategy.”115 The national security strategy 
is still lacking. However, historical precedents suggest strategic trends from which future 
NORSOF roles and mission might be derived. These precedents are connected to the 
requirements of national security policy, i.e., Norway’s role in the international context. 
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As described earlier, contested areas are located in the Barents Region and 
primarily associated with the NEZ. This is primarily a naval task, maintained by the 
Coast Guard and supported by surveillance assets from the Air Force. The Army 
maintains national responsibility for surveillance and control of the shared Norwegian/ 
Russian border, a border which is also is part of EU’s Schengen border.116  
The use of NAF to protect national sovereignty in times of peace is not without 
challenges. Chief of Defense General Diesen, according to the national newspaper 
Verdens Gang, is critical of the increased focus on NAF’s role in the Barents Sea. 
Gunboat diplomacy, he claims, can only be effective if Norway is guaranteed mutual 
political and military support from its Allies. Without this support, diplomacy involving 
threat of force lacks credibility.117  
In a regional context, Norwegian strategic thinking has changed dramatically 
since the end of the Cold War. From a paradigm predicting territorial defense and NATO 
reinforcements in case of war, the new paradigm is focused on expeditionary capabilities 
for NATO’s out-of-area operations. A political as well as a military consensus support 
this new paradigm. Norway’s strategic relevance has diminished since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. To maintain credibility as a NATO ally, support for NATO’s strategic 
concept is deemed necessary. There is, however, no consensus on how to implement this 
paradigm. The recent decision in Parliament to deploy F-16’s in support of NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan, which caused political dispute, can illustrate this. Arguably, 
the dispute was not so much NATO’s request f support per se but rather that the planes 
could be used to support coalition troops involved in OEF.118 Inconveniently for the 
recently elected government, NORSOF was deployed in support of OEF at the time a 
decision had to be made with regard to NATO’s request. The deployment of F-16’s 
eventually occurred, but conveniently not before NORSOF was withdrawn from OEF.  
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The primary institutions shaping Norwegian strategy are the UN, NATO, EU, and 
the US. Since its inception the UN has been considered the principal organ promoting 
international security and stability. Only through international cooperation have smaller 
nations been able to influence great powers and their foreign policy agendas. As part of 
the League of Nations, a small state like Norway was granted “an unprecedented opening 
for [its] voice to be heard on matters of international politics.”119 During the post-WWI 
era, Norway actively pursued a philosophy which “saw the minor powers as guardians of 
higher moral standards in the conduct of international affairs…”120 After WWII, Norway 
continued its active role in shaping the UN, and provided its first Secretary-General, 
Trygve Lie. Support to the UN, as the principal transnational forum for solving 
international disputes, continues to the present day. Thus “[t]he United Nations play a 
key role in Norwegian security policy….Cooperation within the framework of the UN to 
safeguard international peace and security, therefore, is a major concern to Norway.”121  
Since WWII, Norway has contributed considerably to UN operations. Between 
1947 and 2000, more than 50,000 personnel participated in 30 missions around the world, 
the longest commitment being 20 years of commitment to UNIFIL in Lebanon.122 Until 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Norway’s international military contributions were 
exclusively with UN peace operations. Since the mid-1990’s, however, international 
deployments have shifted in favor of NATO and US-led operations. The reason has not 
been discontent with UN so much as a lack of personnel resources.123 
Since its founding, NATO has been the cornerstone of Norwegian security 
policy.124 The emphasis on neutrality that kept Norway out of WWI, but failed to do the 
same in WWII, was abandoned for Alliance partnership in 1949. A new world order, 
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along with the experience of WWII, left few options in the post-WWII security 
environment.  
Yet Norway continued to maintain a “non-aggressive” posture within the 
Alliance, hoping to dampen Great Power tensions on the Scandinavian Peninsula. Several 
restrictions were unilaterally imposed on NATO’s strategy. Neither nuclear weapons nor 
permanent deployment of troops were allowed on national territory in times of peace. 
Another reason to impose restrictions was to ease domestic political disputes with regard 
to foreign policy. During the 1970’s, Norway’s importance as a strategic NATO flank 
increased due to the Soviet Union’s enhanced seaborne nuclear capability. Although 
restrictions were in force, as part of the Alliance strategy several NATO members had 
earmarked units ready for deployment to Norway in case of a conventional attack.125 The 
military strategy was fairly straightforward: maintain a firm posture in defensive 
positions and await Alliance reinforcements. 
Since 1990 NATO has been transforming, as have its member countries. The most 
important result is its out-of-area concept as set forth in its 1999 Strategic Concept and 
reiterated at the Prague Summit in 2002.126 With this concept, NATO and its member 
countries must be prepared for operations on a global scale. This was clearly stated in 
2003 by Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General, who said that NATO “must 
defend [its] security on the Hindukush.”127 The creation of NATO Response Force 
(NRF) is another important result of NATO’s transformation. NRF, which is supposed to 
be fully operational by 2006, is a rapid reaction force designed to conduct the full 
spectrum of military operations from show of force to forced entry operations. Emphasis 
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is put on deployability and interoperability, both necessary to fulfill new missions.128 
NORSOF has been part of Norway’s force contributions to NRF.  
NATO’s ambitions are clear, but the Alliance still works on the basis of political 
consensus. In itself, this principle is uncontested. But unless the mandate is founded in 
NATO’s Article 5, NRF requires consensus for activation. Out-of-area missions could 
thus be politically challenging, especially because NRF participation commits more than 
was involved in earlier contributions.129 It remains to be seen to what extent NRF will be 
an effective deterrent force.  NRF will affect NORSOF future roles and missions because 
emerging missions may be conducted in cultural settings and climate zones not 
previously considered relevant. This will not only affect the operational focus, but also 
factors like personnel selection and training, equipment, training exercises, and support 
elements. 
According to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s core 
mission remains collective defense as defined by NATO’s Charter Article 5. However, 
most of NATO’s involvements since the Cold War have been non-Article 5 missions 
ranging from peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, to combating terrorism 
in the Mediterranean, to supporting disaster relief in Pakistan. Although NATO’s efforts 
are impressive, Scheffer admits the Alliance is driven more by short-term ad-hoc 
decisions than by fundamental strategic choices. “In Afghanistan, for example, [NATO’s] 
political rhetoric was not always matched by corresponding military commitments.”130 
Unless NRF is activated as a collective instrument, national commitments to out-of-area 
operations are made on a case-by-case basis.  
Within NATO, “[i]t is absolutely crucial that Norway consolidates its status as an 
Ally that is considered credible – both politically and militarily.”131 According to State 
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Secretary Barth Eide, ISAF will continue to be the largest operation involving Norwegian 
forces internationally.132 Presently, Norway contributes an infantry company to ISAF and 
has responsibility for one provincial reconstruction team (PRT). NATO will take the lead 
in Afghanistan as the US reduces its presence in 2006, so NATO’s role in the country 
will most likely change.  
The EU is certainly an important political actor, but is not considered a major 
military actor in this thesis. Norway has signed an agreement to participate in EU’s new 
Battle Group concept, and also participates with personnel in EU’s continuing operation 
in Bosnia.133 But Norway is still not part of the EU, and the EU is still working to 
formulate its security policy concept as a realistic alternative to NATO and the US.134 
The EU is thus not yet an important military actor for deriving new roles and missions for 
NORSOF. 
The US plays an important albeit ambiguous role in Norwegian security policy. 
During the Cold War, a close relation to the US as an Ally within NATO was fairly 
unproblematic. During the 1970’s, cooperation increased. Despite national restrictions on 
the Alliance, Norwegian air bases were prepared for rapid deployment of US air assets 
(the COB agreement), and equipment for a complete brigade size reaction force was 
forward deployed in Trøndelag. Airlifts could then deploy personnel rapidly when 
necessary. Likewise, exercises were conducted in the 1980’s, including US carrier groups 
operating as far north as the Vestfjorden basin.135 Due to its proximity to the Soviet 
Union and the naval bases on the Kola Peninsula, an extensive intelligence collaboration 
program developed. Both nations benefited from this cooperation; the US had early 
 
132  Eide, Ny Regjering – Ny Sikkerhets- Og Forsvarspolitikk? 
133  Forsvarsdepartementet, "Avtale Om EU-Innsatsstyrke Signert i Brussel [Agreement on EU 
Reaction Force Signed in Brussels]," Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], 
http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/fd/2005/pressem/010051-070018/dok-bn.html (accessed January 6, 
2006). 
134  Jahn Otto Johansen, "NATO Og De Transatlantiske Motsetninger - Kortsiktige Og Langsiktige 
Perspektiver [NATO and Trans Atlantic Contrasts - Short and Long Term Perspectives]," The Norwegian 
Atlantic Committee - Sikkerhetspolitisk Bibliotek, no. 3 (2004), 8, 
http://www.dnak.org/publikasjoner/sp/2004/pdf/3-2004.pdf (accessed August 22, 2005). 
135  Molvig, Norsk Forsvarspolitikk i 1970- Og 80- Årene. 
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access to signal intelligence, and Norway had access to US technology. In addition, 
keeping close ties to the US reinforced the notion of Norway as an important ally.136 
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed this relationship. Norway does not 
enjoy the same status as an important flank in America’s grand strategy, which also is 
reflected in Relevant Force.137 An alternative scenario is instead that US and Russian 
cooperation on petroleum issues could lead to a marginalization of Norwegian territorial 
interests in the Barents region. It is therefore uncertain how far Norway might rally 
support from the US in case of a more serious territorial dispute.  
As by far the largest contributor to the Alliance, the US is the guarantor of 
NATO’s continuous existence. If NATO should fail and disintegrate in the foreseeable 
future, most likely if the EU were to establish an alternative through its European 
Defense Agency (EDA), Norway will face a strategic choice: To integrate with the EU’s 
defense alternative or to establish a bilateral defense pact with the US. According to Jahn 
Otto Johansen, notable journalist on East- and Central European affairs, the former is not 
a realistic option.138 This is arguably a reason why Relevant Force does not exaggerate 
the political effects of the debacle that occurred between central European actors and the 
US in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is of “utmost importance to Norway that 
NATO’s role as a transatlantic forum for consultation be strengthened.”139 NORSOF 
participation in OEF could then be evaluated as strategically important to maintain this 
relationship. The political effect is probably more important than the military. Viewed in 
this perspective, NORSOF’s strategic utility is clear.  
Since late 1990, most assets deployed for international operations, including 
NORSOF, have been in support of either NATO operations or US-led coalitions in the 
war on terror. Participation in UN operations has declined since 1995. The recently 
elected government, however, has signaled a change in priorities. State Secretary Espen 
Barth Eide, in a speech at the Norwegian Army War College in December 2005, states  
136  Rolf Tamnes, Norges Hemmelige Tjenester Under Den Kalde Krigen - Et Sammenliknende 
Internasjonalt Perspektiv [Norwegian Secret Services During the Cold War - A Comparative International 
Perspective] (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1992). 
137  Forsvarsdepartementet, Relevant Force, 39.  
138  Johansen, NATO Og De Transatlantiske Motsetninger. 
139  Forsvarsdepartementet, Relevant Force, 39.  
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that the new government will increasingly emphasize peace operations, particularly on 
the African continent. International deployments will be diverted from US-led “coalitions 
of the willing” in favor of multilateral organizations like NATO, UN, and the EU. The 
new government will “to a larger degree prioritize Army units for international 
operations. This objective will be achieved by assigning Navy and Air Force capabilities 
to NATO and EU’s standby forces, like NATO NRF.”140 Barth Eide suggests indirectly 
that NRF forces are more or less limited to Article 5- like operations. By its very nature, 
NRF ties up assets that otherwise could be used in peace operations. Accordingly, the 
NRF concept does not allow for NAF being used optimally for foreign policy purposes.  
Whether Eide’s speech should be interpreted as strategic guidelines is open to 
debate. But it is by far the clearest and most current strategic guidance. Based on the 
above analysis, NAF’s future priorities can thus be listed in order: 
1.  Maintain national sovereignty within existing economic and political 
constraints. Unless threats are of military character, NAF’s role is primarily 
limited to a support role for Department of Justice and Police.  
2.  Prepare for NATO collective defense with capable Navy and Air Force units 
to the degree necessary to be assured continued Alliance support for 
domestic purposes when deemed necessary. NRF is the main priority. 
3.  Prepare for NATO non Article 5 scenarios with capable Army units to the 
degree necessary to support NATO’s new strategic concept and thus 
maintain Alliance coherence.  
4.  Prepare for UN peace operations, preferably on the African continent, with 
Army units to the degree necessary to maintain national influence in UN 
decision making processes.  
This list, in the view of this author, is an accurate description of the national 
military strategy at the moment with associated priorities. Based on this list, the 
following goals should guide future NORSOF roles and missions: 
1.  Protect national interests, primarily the oil infrastructure, in NEZ. 
 
140  Eide, Ny Regjering – Ny Sikkerhets- Og Forsvarspolitikk? Author’s translation. 
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2.  Maintain a coherent NATO through participation in Alliance operations and 
standing force contributions. 
3.  Maintain a coherent and credible UN through participating in peace 
operations to promote peace and stability in troubled regions. 
The order of priority is state security, societal security, and human security.  




The current security environment is analyzed in national and international 
contexta. In the national context, threats to state security through conventional war are 
assessed as negligible, at least in the short term. Territorial disputes, especially in the 
Barents region, are instead the main area of concern. Jurisdiction in NEZ is primarily a 
Navy responsibility. Recent events in the region demonstrate the disputed nature of this 
area. The Army maintains jurisdiction on the Russian border which is part of EU’s 
Schengen agreement. The threat to the border is first and foremost associated with 
organized crime. 
In an international context, terrorism, failed and rogue states, and WMD 
proliferation are the dominant threats to international stability. Threats to societal security 
are first and foremost associated with international terrorism. There have so far been no 
terror incidents in Norway or against Norwegian interests abroad. National security 
authorities assert, however, that it is only a matter of time before Scandinavia will be hit.  
In the larger scheme, conflict patterns have changed, indicating a shift from 
conventional interstate wars towards intrastate wars with regional or global spillover 
effects. Conflicts have become politicized over the last 100 years as civilians are 
increasingly targeted by combatants.  
There is no coherent military strategy from which NORSOF roles and missions 
can be easily derived. Therefore, existing practice and recent political statements are used 
to grasp the essence of a national military strategy. For the purpose of state survival, 
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Norway’s predominant strategy continues to be remaining a credible ally in NATO. Only 
through active participation can this credibility be maintained. NATO is vital for national 
interests, hence Alliance cohesion is important. Only a continuous US presence and 
interest in the Alliance can maintain this cohesion. The EU is not a viable alternative to 
NATO. 
The recently elected government has clearly signaled a diversion of emphasis 
from US-led coalition operations to NATO and UN operations. Operations in 
Afghanistan through ISAF will be NAF’s main focus in the forthcoming years. UN 
operations, especially in Africa, will increasingly be emphasized. Participation in UN 
operations will be conducted primarily with Army units. To maintain NATO obligations, 


















                                                
IV. FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS 
This chapter begins by evaluating current and future NORSOF roles and missions. 
The discussion emphasizes principal SOF approaches to warfare through direct and 
indirect capabilities as outlined by Tucker and Lamb.141 The intent is not to cover the 
complete spectrum of tactical missions but to focus on what are perceived and assessed as 
characteristic roles within each approach. The strategic value of NORSOF is also 
assessed. The question under consideration is, what are appropriate roles and missions for 
NORSOF in the future?  
The last section of the chapter discusses issues of future transformation. So far, it 
appears that the inconsistency stated in the hypothesis stems from a lack of strategic 
guidance and a separation of roles more than from violations of the principles of 
transformation. The question remains: Is the current organization inconsistent with future 
roles and missions? 
 
A. EXPANDING ROLES AND MISSIONS 
An important condition for this discussion is that future roles and missions are 
derived from expected future threats. As such, they are not based on current wars, 
although lessons learned from current operations certainly apply. In other words, 
previous experience from OEF and possible future engagements in Sudan are not the only 
experiences shaping future roles and missions. If this were the case, a strategic 
perspective on transformation would be meaningless.  
One approach to emerging NORSOF missions is to look at the total spectrum of 
NAF’s missions and roles, determine which missions are maintained by conventional 
forces, and subsequently assign NORSOF missions and roles to fill the “gap.” There are 
two principal reasons why this approach is not used. First, current CHOD indicates that 
the principle of maintaining a balanced defense structure is no longer relevant. Hence the 
gap is probably already too large for NORSOF to fill. In addition, to operationalize the 
 
141  Tucker and Lamb, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, 1-6. 
concept of “balanced defense structure” is a challenge. Second, the emphasis on NATO 
as the cornerstone of national security policy forces Norway to participate with certain 
capabilities. The common denominator for SOF in NATO is AJP-01(B). Hence the focus 
for the following discussion is on the two principal SOF roles through direct and indirect 
capabilities. It also follows from this chapter that NORSOF roles should be clarified and 
identified in a national and international context, with the latter limited to include NATO 
and the UN.  
This paper reduces the spectrum of operations to a dichotomy—war and peace—
rather than using the division peace-crisis-war. The dichotomy is especially useful in a 
national context where NAF has its primary role. A grey zone certainly exists, but to 
make the discussion clearer, the term crisis is avoided.  In a NATO context, the spectrum 
of operations is defined as Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations, where Article 5 
operations are collective defense of trans-Atlantic sovereignty, while non-Article 5 
operations, or Crisis Response Operations (CRO), encompass all other NATO 
engagements.142 For UN operations, the spectrum of operations is simply defined as 
Peace Support Operations (PSO).143 This framework is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Framework for new roles 
 
                                                 
142  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), para 2204.  
143 AJP-01(B) chapter 22, section III. Peace Support Operations miht be divided into Peacekeeping 
and Peace Enforcement. In this thesis this distinction is not made because the focus is held on the impartial 
aspect of UN operations. Whether operations are offensive or defensive is deemed less relevant. 
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1. The National Context 
To begin this discussion, it is useful to refer to the following statement in 
Relevant Force:   
The use of military force by Norway in a purely national context is first 
and foremost an option in limited situations, connected to the exercise of 
national sovereignty and authority. In all other situations, the NAF will 
operate in a multinational framework – both inside and outside of 
Norway.144  
Except for a clear military violation of national sovereignty and authority – an act 
of war – NAF’s role is limited. The peacetime role is important, though, and potentially 
includes operations within as well as outside national borders. The Elektron incident 
illustrates operations within national borders. Potential roles outside national borders are 
illustrated by recent reactions to the “cartoon case,” the series of controversial cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Muhammad. The reactions to the publication of these cartoons 
included the burning of the Norwegian Embassy in Syria.145 
In war, NORSOF’s current roles will arguably still apply. Insofar as a military 
threat or situation exists, NORSOF’s traditional roles will probably be as applicable in 
the future as they were during the Cold War. Both new concepts of warfare, like network 
centric warfare or information operations, and adaptation to new technology certainly 
apply to NORSOF as for NAF in general. This will not affect special operations per se, 
except that emerging technology and new concepts must be adapted and implemented. 
Direct action capabilities within the spectrum of DA and SR will therefore continue to be 
relevant.  
Although NORSOF can conduct independent missions in the operational or 
strategic realm, its mission potential is highest in conjunction with conventional 
operations. This assertion seems reasonable knowing that the overall strength of NAF, in 
terms of maneuver units, has been significantly reduced since the Cold War. Likewise, 
conventional units increasingly adapt better technology and weapons systems, further 
 
144  Forsvarsdepartementet, Relevant Force. 
145  Kristin Welle- Strand, "Ambassaden i Syria Brent Ned [Embassy in Syria on Fire]," Verdens 
Gang, http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=181765 (accessed March 20, 2006). 
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reinforcing this point. SOF has also played an increasingly key role in conventional 
campaigns. The integration of SOF and the Air Force is often considered the successful 
formula behind the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In a national 
context, within the next five to ten years Norway will have the most modern Navy in 
Europe.146 It thus seems important for NORSOF to continue to integrate with the 
conventional parts of NAF, not only to gain support for its own operations, but also to 
support naval operations in the littoral. The same logic will apply to new concepts within 
land and air warfare.  
Indirect capabilities, as described by doctrine, are less likely to be applicable in 
war on national territory. The primary role will be to apply capabilities directly at the 
enemy, not indirectly through a surrogate force. There is one exception, though, which is 
acting in an advisory role for both conventional and SOF Allied units. With few 
exceptions, international forces have proven less capable of operating independently in 
Norway, especially in winter. According to USSOCOM, in Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, coalition warfare—warfighting with forces from more than one 
nation—“was arguably the most important of all the SOCCENT missions.”147 This 
advisory role was assigned to both SEALs and to the Fifth Special Forces Group (5th 
SFG). Because NATO does not pre-designate units for Article 5 operations as it did in the 
case of Cold War scenarios, Norway cannot know in advance which units will deploy 
with Norway in support of Article 5 operations. Coalition warfare should therefore apply 
to NORSOF.  
In times of peace, it follows from Relevant Force that missions and roles are 
limited to issues involving sovereignty and authority. Whenever the military is used 
outside its primary role, this will be within the context of other departments, and most 
likely the Department of Justice and Police. This pertains to the Coast Guard maintaining 
 
146  Ole M. Rapp, "Får Europas Beste Marine [the Best Navy in Europe]," Aftenposten, 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article962380.ece (accessed January 17, 2006). 
147  USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command: History (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 
2002), 37. 
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national interests in the Barents region, the Army’s expanded Schengen mission on the 
Norwegian-Russian border, and HJK in its CT role in NEZ.148  
The MJK has the capability for ship boarding, or Maritime Interdict Operations 
(MIO).149 This role is useful for supporting naval units like the Coast Guard. Where 
required and authorized, NORSOF support could thus be utilized to maintain national 
interests where civilian authorities lack capability. Again, the Elektron incident illustrates 
this point.  
The Elektron incident, however, has spurred an emerging debate over NAF’s 
domestic role and responsibility in times of peace. The Home Guard is currently being 
restructured and equipped to focus on terrorism instead of its traditional role, which has 
been focused on security of vital property. This shift of focus has created tension between 
NAF and the police. According to an unidentified police source, “it is a paradox that parts 
of NAF are specializing in services that are not in demand.”150 The question is not 
whether terrorism is a threat; rather, the question is whether this is a role for NAF in 
times of peace. Truls Fyhn, Chief of Police in Tromsø, claims that the police’s own CT 
unit, Beredskapstroppen, has the capability to handle jurisdictional incidents requiring the 
use of force, including support to the Coast Guard.151  
Whether or not Fyhn is right with regard to tactical capability is of little interest 
for this paper, although it is clear that the police do not have the necessary tactical 
mobility to execute complex missions offshore without military support. Fyhn’s main 
argument, however, is that jurisdictional responsibility over use-of-force in times of 
 
148 See Merete Voreland, "Utfordringer i Norske Kyst Og Havområder [Challenges in Norwegian 
Maritime Areas]," Forsvaret [Norwegian Defense], 
http://www.mil.no/sjo/kv/start/article.jhtml?articleID=110005 (accessed January 17, 2006); 
Forsvarsdepartementet, "Forsvarets Bistand Til Politiet [Armed Forces Support to Police]," 
Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/dok/regelverk/010011-
990214/dok-bn.html (accessed January 17, 2006); Eide, Ny Regjering – Ny Sikkerhets- Og 
Forsvarspolitikk? 
149  Kysteskadren, Det Nye Sjøforsvaret: Omstilling i Sjøforsvaret 2004-2010 [Changing the Navy 
2004-2010], 5. 
150  Sveinung B. Bentzrød, "Politi Mot Forsvaret i Terrorkonflikt [Police Against the Military in 
Terror Conflict]," Aftenposten, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article1164493.ece2005). 
151  NTB, "Beredskapstroppen Burde Stoppet 'Elektron' [Police Delta Force Should Have Stopped 
'Elektron']," Verdens Gang, http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=299536 (accessed January 10, 2006). 
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peace is not clear. A grey zone thus exists between the police and the military with regard 
to CT. An occupied oil platform in NEZ is geographically confined within Norwegian 
jurisdictional territory, but outside the reach of normal police duty. To use HJK in a 
designated role for this scenario seems fairly unproblematic. To what extent NORSOF 
can be assigned specific roles beyond offshore scenarios, is, however, uncertain. The 
counterargument is that available assets should be used whenever the situation dictates. 
This is certainly true. But facing a more dangerous and destructive terrorist than the 
initial offshore scenario was intended to counter, a rigid set of rules might be obsolete.  
If Fyhn is right, then there is redundancy between civilian and military authorities 
with regard to jurisdiction over NORSOF roles. The MJK’s MIO role, however, is of 
interest in an alliance context. Hence, a redundant capability exists for national purposes. 
Implicit in Fyhn’s assertions is also that the police might have tactical capability with 
regard to CT operations on petroleum installations in NEZ. Insofar, this role is not 
officially contested.  
The role of NORSOF in support of national authority outside Norway, 
noncombatant evacuation operations and hostage rescue seems clearer. The wellbeing of 
national citizens is a national responsibility. Such incidents are not covered through 
national doctrine, but it follows from AJP-01(B) that NATO or NATO forces could ally 
to initiate such operations.152 From international experience, NEO and HR frequently 
involve the use of SOF, and the role should thus be applicable for NORSOF as well. This 
scenario is illustrated by the kidnapping of the Norwegian UN observer Knut Gjellestad 
in Sierra Leone in 2000. Gjellestad was eventually rescued in a British operation.153 
Because failed or rogue states continue to exist, especially on the African continent, and 
radical terrorist groups deliberately target Western citizens, both missions will likely 
emerge in the future.  
 
152  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), para 2230. 
153  V. G. Nett, "Hensynsløse Soldater Holder Gjellestad Som Gissel [Ruthless Soldiers Keep 
Gjellestad Hostage]," Verdens Gang, http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=7368061 (accessed February 7, 
2006). 
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Normally, NEO is associated with military operations, and is thus generally 
undisputed with regard to jurisdiction. Depending on the circumstances, a NEO operation 
involving national citizens clearly justifies NORSOF participation. The role of NORSOF 
is less clear with regard to HR. It will certainly depend on the circumstances, such as  
whether the hostage is located in a conflict area where friendly forces are deployed, like 
Afghanistan or Iraq, or whether it is a civilian in any given country. The former would 
arguably fall under the domain of Department of Defense, the latter under the Department 
of Justice and Police.  
However, Politiforum, a journal for the Norwegian police, reports that 
Beredskapstroppen recently participated in the Balkan theater as a combined CT police 
unit called Team Six, among others conducting HR operations.154 Norwegian citizens 
have not been the objective, but nevertheless this indicates that the police have the 
capability for international operations in areas where jurisdiction might not be as clear as 
if hostages were located in Baghdad or London. The previously described tension 
between police and NAF in domestic operations could thus exist in operations outside 
national territory. However, HR seems appropriate for NORSOF given HJK’s existing 
CT mission and MJK’s maritime MIO capability. 
The national roles for NORSOF are traditionally CT in NEZ along with possible 
support to other military units with regard to jurisdiction. Open source documentation 
suggests that HJK’s CT role is the only role assigned NORSOF in times of peace. Other 
missions thus depend on availability of forces at any given time. Two roles normally 
associated with SOF, NEO and HR, seem appropriate for NORSOF as well.  
Missions and roles as derived above all fall under SOF direct action capabilities. 
Given the previous discussion, it is necessary to clarify the roles of NORSOF vs. the 
police. This has ramifications for NORSOF’s readiness status, which eventually ties up 
scarce resources that could be used more efficiently elsewhere.  
This author has defined NORSOF’s strategic role as promoting national foreign 
policy objectives. This role is not defined by doctrine. Vanderbrouche defines strategic 
 
154  Politiforum, "Takk Og Pris (Editorial) [Thank God!]," Politiforum, 
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SOF missions as offensive strikes seeking to achieve foreign policy objectives, citing the 
Bay of Pigs and the 1980 attempt to rescue US embassy personnel in Iran as examples.155 
According to Vanderbrouche, a national HR capability falls within the strategic realm. 
 Whether Norway, with its current foreign political ambitions, has the political 
and military will to conduct such strikes is questionable. Dr. Richard H. Shultz Jr., 
longtime analyst and writer on military affairs, questions whether even the US dare use 
its SOF in a strategic offensive role for national purposes. Prior to 9/11, then-President 
Clinton signed several presidential directives targeting Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda 
network. Despite the political will, in most cases the Pentagon was reluctant to conduct 
SO for this purpose.156 This runs contrary to the belief that politicians are more reluctant 
to use military force than the military itself. 
Much changed after 9/11, but such strikes conducted today or in the future are 
likely to be within an Alliance or coalition context. Although NATO is a political as well 
as military organization, its role as a foreign policy instrument is limited to Alliance 
consensus. Excluding an HR scenario, it is unclear to what extent Norway can garner 
sufficient support within the Alliance to pursue national foreign policy objectives.  
According to Hans Binnendijk, Director of the Center for the Study of Technology and 
National Security Policy at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, NATO’s NRF 
force is not constructed to act in this role. Unless NATO develops a NATO Special 
Operations Force concept broadly modeled on the USSOCOM concept, NATO SOF will 
not in itself constitute a strategic resource.157 NORSOF’s role as a strike force pursuing 
national foreign policy objectives is thus limited, although HR operations could be 
defined as strategic strikes. 
Strategic utility, however, might be achieved by other means. In Commandos and 
Politicians, Dr. Eliot Cohen suggests three motivations for the creation, nurturance, and 
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deployment of elite military units: military utility, the romantic image of war, and 
political utility.158 While Cohen’s definition of military utility and the romantic image of 
war might not be useful for understanding strategic utility as defined by this author, his 
discussion on political utility is more promising. Due to the increasingly political aspect 
of conflicts after WWII – who shall rule as opposed to what shall be ruled over – Cohen 
suggests that “small, discrete military actions can be used to signal to a number of 
audiences (an opposing government, its population, one’s own population) threats, 
commitments, and intents.”159 NORSOF’s deployment to Afghanistan late 2001 is an 
example of such a signaling effort. While this might have been unintentional (the mission 
was initially a low profile deployment) the deployment clearly signaled national will and 
commitment to both domestic and international audiences. Deploying NORSOF indicated 
a policy shift wherein Norway deployed offensive units intended for combat operations. 
Whether political opponents agreed on the decision is irrelevant. NORSOF brought 
national values and colors to the fight. By deploying a capable and relevant force, the 
government achieved this effect while simultaneously lowering the political risk; the 
military footprint was low, yet capable; the standard of the forces was high, hence the 
probability of success high as well. Using NORSOF in this role could thus be interpreted 
as pursuing foreign policy objectives.  
This effect is not necessarily exclusive to NORSOF, as other units were deployed 
more or less simultaneously. Later in 2002, F-16s were deployed, and mine clearance 
troops were deployed before NORSOF to Afghanistan. But NORSOF was the first 
Norwegian combat unit to be deployed and utilized. A “signaling” role contradicts the 
low profile generally sought in conjunction with SO, and is thus open to question. 
Thus it is unclear to what extent NORSOF is a strategic force beyond the military 
domain. Gray asserts that SOF only “have strategic meaning…with reference to war, or 
other kinds of conflict, as a whole.”160 While Vandenbroucke disagrees, the question is 
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whether Norway is willing or capable to use NORSOF for strategic purposes, i.e., to 
pursue policy objectives. The albeit limited earlier discussion suggests that NORSOF’s 
strategic impact is low except for its potential signaling effect, an effect that also can be 
attributed to conventional units. 
A principal arrangement of NORSOF missions in a national context could thus be 
depicted as in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.   NORSOF potential for SO missions in a national context 
 
2. NATO and the UN  
For NATO operations, the dichotomy of peace/war is replaced by the dichotomy 
of Article 5/CRO. The previous discussion of national roles in war pertains to Article 5 
operations as well, since Article 5 primarily is concerned with territorial defense. It can 
thus be concluded that the discussion of national roles in times of war applies to NATO 
and Article 5. For territorial defense purposes, NORSOF’s current direct action 
capabilities therefore apply.  
The extent to which NRF will be used beyond Article 5 operations remains to be 
seen. It is clear that NRF is intended as an initial entry force with capabilities within the 
complete spectrum of operations. NRF is designed as a “first in–first out” expeditionary 
force.161 SOF support to NRF operations are thus likely to be within the direct action 
spectrum of capabilities. Beyond global reach and Alliance integration, which might 
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require extended training in various climate zones and combined joint exercises, SOF’s 
roles will arguably remain constant.  
Although NATO’s strategic concept implies that threats are challenged before 
reaching Alliance territory, it is less likely that NATO will initiate preventive operations. 
Given the negative European reaction to the US concept of preventive war, preventive 
military operations are less likely to be a political option for NATO. Offensive “war by 
consensus” is inherently more challenging than its defensive counterpart. Non-Article 5 
conditions are therefore likely to apply to most, if not all, out-of-area operations.  
This leaves Norway with an option regarding future NORSOF roles and missions, 
because out-of-area operations are based on national interests, and not Alliance 
requirements. “[U]nlike Collective Defence operations, there is no automatic 
commitment of forces for non-Article 5 CRO…”162 Further, “[a] nation’s level of interest 
in a non-Article 5 CRO may vary in relation to its national strategic interest in the 
operation. Therefore, national commitment to provide forces will vary accordingly…”163 
Given the low probability of Article 5 scenarios in today’s Euro-Atlantic area, this 
suggests NORSOF should adapt new roles to stay relevant beyond Article 5. This 
assertion is based on strategies increasingly pursued by both the Norwegian government 
and NATO.  
According to Scheffer, NATO’s core mission remains collective defense. But he 
also asserts that NATO should be used throughout the complete spectrum of operations, 
including non-military missions like nation building.164 SOF in general and NORSOF in 
particular could certainly play a key role at this lower end of the conflict scale. From US 
experience, low intensity conflicts (LIC) have traditionally been a SOF niche 
capability.165 Although direct action capabilities are applicable in low intensity scenarios, 
indirect capabilities have traditionally proven more effective against insurgents and 
 
162  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), Para 2204. 
163  Ibid., para 2209. 
164  Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,  “Keeping NATO Relevant: A Shareholders Report,”  Speech by NATO 
Secretary General at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session, Copenhagen, 15 November 
2005. 
165  Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action. 
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irregular opponents. The latter is exemplified by the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Knowing that wars are increasingly politicized further underscores the 
necessity of an indirect approach to win hearts and minds.166 
The essence of the indirect approach is to work by, with, and through an 
indigenous force or population to gain tactical and strategic advantages. As per AJP-
01(B), MA as an indirect approach broadly includes two roles: the guerrilla/insurgency 
role, and peace operations, as discussed in Chapter II. These roles can be broadly 
distinguished by the relationship to the host nation or the belligerents. Acting in the first 
role, the operation supports one side in a conflict, either the existing government or its 
opponent. Conversely, in peace operations, the operation does not support a side, but 
rather works to stabilize the conflict. Peace operations can be divided into peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement, depending on the nature of the conflict and to what extent the 
stabilizing force is accepted by the belligerents.  
From the previous analysis, it is clear that NORSOF is not traditionally focused 
on the indirect spectrum of capabilities. Because most contemporary conflicts pertain to 
the low intensity range of the scale, and because this trend will probably continue for the 
foreseeable future, changing focus could increase NORSOF’s flexibility and relevance. 
The instructor role is thus applicable, whether this role applies to an organization within 
the host government (FID) or at the local village level (UW). Instead of using the US 
terms FID and UW, the term advisor, also found in doctrine, is appropriate. The USSF is 
used widely in this role to train elements of the national Army, including in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In a broad sense, the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Meymaneh, Afghanistan, is part of an indirect strategy. While the PRT effort is run by 
conventional units, there is no reason why NORSOF could not contribute in a USSF-like 
role in remote or high threat areas, or where a large conventional footprint is impossible 
or undesirable. This capability does not currently exist.  
 
166 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review 
(November- December, 2005), 2-15. Aylwin-Foster criticizes the US Army’s tendency to place too much 
emphasis on offensive approaches to destroying Iraqi insurgents in later phases of OIF.  
In Afghanistan, NATO supports the existing government through ISAF. Thus the 
counterinsurgency role (COIN) in all its aspects will increasingly be important. So far, 
ISAF is not involved in the more troubled southeast region of Afghanistan. With the 
Afghan insurgency rising steadily, NATO will have to face this challenge as the US   
decreases its presence.167 For Norway to contribute with a competent COIN capability 
adds to the relevancy of NAF. For NORSOF to be assigned MA as an additional core 
capability adds to the relevancy of NORSOF as a niche capability in NATO.  
Roles and mission in a NATO context are exemplified in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.   NORSOF potential for SO missions in a NATO context 
 
It is also clear from current government statements that Norway will increasingly 
focus its military support on UN operations. In 2006, NAF will deploy to Sudan, possibly 
through the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). It is not yet clear what capabilities will be 
assigned to the mission. According to State Secretary Barth-Eide, Norway does not 
presently have forces with the necessary competence to participate in UN operations.168 
He does, however, claim that Norway could deploy command and control capabilities, 
intelligence, communication, and CIMIC units, along with “capable combat elements like 
                                                 
167  Michael Smith, "Afghan Posting 'Too Dangerous' for Dutch Army," The Sunday Times, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1880012,00.html (accessed January 18, 2006). 
168  Marita I. Wangberg, "Nordisk Samarbeid Om FN- Bidrag [Nordic Cooperation on UN 
Participation]," Forsvaret [Norwegian Defense], http://www.mil.no/start/article.jhtml?articleID=113314 
(accessed January 18, 2006). 
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mechanized infantry and special operations forces.”169 In one sense, this is a 
misperception of the general capabilities SOF can bring to the operation, and amplifies 
NORSOF as a direct action capability. On the other hand, his statement also underscores 
NORSOF’s lack of capabilities beyond direct action. 
Whether NORSOF represents a capability intended to deploy for UN operations, 
or whether the UN actually wants SOF capabilities in their operations, is of less relevance 
for this paper. This is ultimately a political decision. More relevant is NORSOF’s 
potential capabilities in case of political will. In other words, can NORSOF be utilized for 
UN operations? If missions are appropriate for SOF in the first place, it seems less 
important whether the operation is led by the UN or NATO. NORSOF’s existing 
offensive capabilities should thus be applicable. In addition, by virtue of its SO status, 
NORSOF has certain tactical capabilities that technically should be relevant in UN 
operations: a small organizational footprint, a substantial C2 capability, and enhanced 
medical capability. These are capabilities that should make NORSOF capable of 
participating in e.g., initial entry operations, area assessments, and other operations not 
dependent on a large conventional presence. NORSOF’s intelligence capabilities could 
also be utilized in early phases of an operation to establish early warning indicators, 
although this might require skills beyond those considered necessary during the Cold 
War.  
Increasing emphasis on indirect capabilities will allow more robust NORSOF 
participation, which also could extend over time. An indirect approach, however, would 
require increased emphasis on the social, political, and cultural aspects of a conflict. To 
be effective in this “less direct” setting requires prior training and mental preparation. It 
is not good enough to be a Special Operator to sustain these capabilities.170 These 
requirements apply to CRO operations as well. The ability to operate in the cultural and 
political setting of the conflict would allow NORSOF to fully employ existing tactical 
capabilities as mentioned above. In addition, working through the local population in, for 
 
169 Eide, Ny Regjering – Ny Sikkerhets- Og Forsvarspolitikk? Author’s translation. 
170 See Tucker and Lamb, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, 1-6. 
example, a Sudan scenario would add to the intelligence collection aspect of the 
operation.  
NORSOF’s potential missions and roles in PSO are depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.   NORSOF potential missions in an UN context 
 
3. Implications  
The most important observation from the previous section is that NORSOF lacks 
indirect capabilities. Two questions emerge from this discussion. First, is increased 
emphasis on indirect capabilities desirable or necessary? Second, can direct action and 
indirect action capabilities be developed within the context of a single unit?  
Given the priorities for security, direct action capabilities should continue to be 
NORSOF’s primary focus. Indirect action capabilities are not necessary for national 
defense purposes. Accepting that international cooperation is vital for national defense 
purposes does not alter this assertion. However, national defense is a function of 
international cooperation, which requires Alliance participation, with NATO as the 
cornerstone. Because current NATO operations are conducted under CRO conditions and 
NATO will be increasingly involved in protracted low intensity conflicts, indirect 
capabilities will increasingly be demanded or preferred. More emphasis on UN 
operations will reinforce this demand. NAF and NORSOF will thus become more 
involved in political conflicts where population control, impartiality, human rights, and 
controlled use of force are keywords. By focusing on indirect capabilities, NORSOF will 
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continue to be relevant. By maintaining its direct action capabilities, NORSOF will 
continue to be flexible. The answer to the first question, then, is yes. 
Can a focus on both direct and indirect action capabilities be maintained within a 
single unit? The answer is not obvious.  Increasingly, combatants must be able to switch 
between high intensity combat operations and humanitarian assistance, all within the 
same mission. It is a challenging task, and one that few conventional militaries train 
for.171 Within the US SOF community, Army SF has the indirect approach as its primary 
role (UW), while the Navy SEALs have direct action roles as their primary task. Yet both 
units have historically first and foremost been used in direct action roles. According to 
Adams, Army SF actually prefers direct action roles over indirect action. One possible 
explanation is that indirect warfare strategies have never been emphasized by the 
conventional military, in part because indirect action missions are “very hard to define 
and prepare for.”172 The US military experience in Vietnam illustrates what happens 
when a direct action strategy is consistently applied to an enemy who just as consistently 
refuses to fight on those terms. The current Iraqi conflict also demonstrates that 
conventional military strategies might prove ineffective against a ferocious 
insurgency.173  
Tucker and Lamb claim that it is essential to distinguish between the two SOF 
approaches. Not only is it necessary to distinguish roles at the tactical level, i.e., what unit 
is assigned what capability, but USSOCOM should assign responsibility for direct and 
indirect capabilities to two separate commands within the strategic headquarters. Only 
through such a division will an indirect approach (military assistance, in NATO terms) 
receive the proper attention.174 This division is neither possible nor desirable for Norway 
for several reasons, including national ambitions and the size of the forces involved. But 
Tucker and Lamb’s argument underscores that an offensive nature does not imply 
 
171  Max Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military," Foreign Affairs, March/April (2005). 103-
118. 
172  Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 307. 
173  Aylwin-Foster, Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations, 2-15. 
174  Tucker and Lamb, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, 1-6. 
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excellence or even competence in MA. This view is shared by Adams.175 British (UK) 
SOF, on the other hand, does not seem to distinguish between indirect and direct 
capabilities to the same degree as the US does. This is less documented through literature.  
The British way of war, however, is distinguished from the Americans’ by their historical 
precedents in fighting small wars and counterinsurgency operations. This is a heritage 
from colonial times, and so is contemporary British doctrine.176 Whereas British SOF has 
contributed successfully in counterinsurgency operations as part of British colonial and 
post-colonial wars, NORSOF is regarded as a niche capability within NATO. Thus the 
question: With no longstanding national military culture beyond national defense, is 
British experience and practice, embracing the full spectrum of SO capabilities separated 
by a maritime/land role, a better model than the US for Norway?  It is important to note 
that no definite line exists within either model, although the intent is to assign primary 
and secondary missions and roles instead of having overlap. To develop niche 
capabilities, which is Norway’s primary approach to alliance warfare, dividing direct and 
indirect capabilities between two units seems more appropriate than not. 
This leads to a third question with regard to future NORSOF roles: if NORSOF is 
assigned responsibility for an indirect capability, will it be utilized effectively, assuming 
that indirect capabilities involve protracted engagements? The US SOF community 
consists of more than 50,000 personnel, more than twice the size of NAF in total. Norway 
has signaled a contribution of 200 soldiers to the forthcoming UN mission in Sudan. Will 
an MA-capable NORSOF make a difference? Given Norway’s previous experience with 
UN operations, a capable NORSOF element could easily make a difference, depending  
on what strategies are adopted in the operation. If capabilities do not exist, however, the 
chosen strategy is likely to reflect this. You can only wish for what you have. 
 
 
175  Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, ch. 11. 
176  Robert M. Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," 
Military Review, May-June (2005), 53-59. 
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B. TRANSFORMING NORSOF 
The last part of this chapter presents ideas about the transformation of NORSOF. 
The underlying question is whether the current organization structure is inconsistent with 
future roles and missions.  Put differently, do future requirements justify maintaining the 
current organizational structure? One clear challenge is the lack of a framework for how 
NORSOF should redefine or clarify its roles. Based on existing practice and security 
policy, it is reasonable to assume that Norway can choose its future wars unless 
operations are initiated through a NATO Article 5 scenario. Out-of-area operations, CRO, 
are based on national voluntariness, and participation is usually rooted in national interest 
of some sort.177 Technically, then, NORSOF should be able to adapt new roles based on 
which wars Norway choose to participate in. These are the wars that justify the term 
niche capability. A war on national territory will not require niche capabilities; it would 
require a total effort of available assets, whether labeled “niche” or not.  
Given the analysis in Chapter II, choosing missions and roles using NORSOF as 
the level of analysis is fairly easy, but separating roles and missions using MJK and HJK 
as the level of analysis could be a challenge. The existing division is rooted in a naval/ 
land warfare framework. The inconsistency suggests this framework can be considered 
obsolete or at least less relevant. Existing doctrine does not distinguish maritime skills 
from land warfare capabilities. Historical practice, both national and international, does 
indicate the relevance of service-based SOF affiliation. Underwater capabilities are skill 
sets historically developed within a Navy context. Operations inland are traditionally 
thought of as an Army capability; hence Army SOF has developed with skills 
traditionally found within the Army. In NORSOF history, this has been the traditional 
separation of roles. But history is also inconsistent. Questions frequently arise about 
whether MJK should be equipped and train with vehicles, or whether HJK should be 
equipped and train with rubber boats. As suggested above, MJK and HJK today possess 
capabilities normally thought of as part of each other’s domain. MJK’s operations in 
 
177 See Preben Bonnén for an alternative view of Denmark’s choice of wars in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. Preben Bonnén, "Danmarks Valg Af Krige Og De Indenrigspolitiske Konsekvenser Af En Aktiv 
Udenrigspolitik [the Danish Choice of Wars and Consequences of an Active Foreign Policy]," Norsk 
Militært Tidsskrift, no. 5 (2005), 11-15. 
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Afghanistan and HJK’s maritime CT mission suggest this is true. While other, 
comparable nations continue to maintain service-based capabilities, the same nations 
continue to use their SOF units in scenarios in Afghanistan and Iraq regardless of service 
affiliation. This suggests overlapping capabilities are common with regard to SOF, and 
that certain types of missions can be considered generic to SOF regardless of service 
affiliation. The challenge is to draw a dividing line in so that units do not duplicate all 
their special missions and special gear, the latter clearly entailing a cost factor. If units 
are duplicated, then the rationale for separate units seems weak.  
The rest of this paper is concerned with transformation issues. St.prp.nr.42 (2003-
2004) provides broad guidelines for the transformation of NAF and NORSOF, defining 
military transformation as “…a change in the structure and characteristics of military 
forces as well as the way they operate.”178 The hypothesis of this thesis is that the current 
organization is inconsistent with future missions and roles. A merged organization is then 
treated as the dependent variable, while missions and roles are treated as the independent 
variables. St.prp.nr.42 further outlines criteria or factors to which military transformation 
should conform. These factors are treated as intervening variables.  
A major principle for the overall transformation is to maintain complementary 
instead of overlapping capabilities, meaning two units should not possess similar core 
capabilities. Flexibility is another principle, and could be defined broadly as the ability to 
cover a widest possible spectrum of tasks or operations. This factor is then understood as 
flexibility with regard to the spectrum of operations, meaning operations ranging from 
high intensity conventional war, to humanitarian operations and perhaps to nation 
building. Relevance for NATO’s structure is important due to the change of focus from 
national operations to international participation through NATO or other coalition 
operations. Units exclusively designed for national purposes will only exist to the degree 
that their capabilities are unique to the defense of national territory. Such units will not be 
trained and equipped to participate in out-of-area operations. A revitalized Home Guard 
exemplifies such a force element. Since the UN is increasingly vitalized as an organ for 
future operations, the author adds the UN to this factor. The traditional focus on services 
 
178  Forsvarsdepartementet, St.Prp.Nr.42 (2003-2004), 50. Author’s translation. 
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is considered less vital for the future as joint operations will be dominant. This does not 
imply service affiliation is obsolete, but whether a capability belongs to the Navy or 
Army is deemed less relevant in an operational context. This factor, interoperability,  
relates most to how units are trained and equipped to fit interoperability standards.179  
According to St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004), two additional requirements are particular 
to NORSOF. The first is the requirement to increase NORSOF’s general capability in 
order to improve “national freedom of action, flexibility, and sustainability.”180 This 
increase is important for fulfilling NATO requirements as well. While this requirement 
could be associated with increased unit size, this paper defines increased capability in 
terms of scope of SOF core tasks. This factor is closely associated with the general 
principle of complementary capabilities. Since NORSOF, by definition, is 
complementary to NAF, the complementary factor will be discussed in the context of 
NORSOF. Complementary instead of overlapping tasks thus equals scope of SOF core 
capabilities. Ideally, the widest possible scope will enhance national freedom and 
flexibility.  
The second requirement is that HJK and MJK should be able to conduct 
operations as one single unit or entity. NORSOF interoperability is thus important. Since 
recent operations demonstrate that NORSOF is interoperable with coalition partners, 
NORSOF interoperability will substitute for the general term interoperability mentioned 
above.  
The last factor pertaining to NORSOF’s transformation is its strategic role, 
arguably a new one since the end of the Cold War. This factor, more than any, should 
determine future organizational structure, but this role is not listed as a factor per se. 
Rather, it should be viewed as such once the future organization is developed. 




179  Forsvarsdepartementet, St.Prp.Nr.42 (2003-2004, 53-54. 
180  Ibid., 56. Author’s translation. 
Flexibility within the spectrum of SOF core capabilities 
Flexibility within the spectrum of operations  
Relevance for NATO and UN 
NORSOF interoperability 
NORSOF’s strategic role 
Table 1. Factors pertaining to NORSOF transformation 
 
1. Flexibility Within the Spectrum of SOF Core Capabilities 
In this paper SOF core capabilities are defined as a dichotomy, separating direct 
from indirect action capabilities. Chapter II suggests that MJK and HJK have capabilities 
within the direct action spectrum. How complementary their capabilities are today can 
only be determined by looking at the individual unit focus on either land or naval 
warfare, a study that would be classified. The land/naval aspect—the domain in which 
the forces are designed to operate—thus does matter. This is illustrated in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15.   SOF core capabilities 
 
Both units have repeatedly demonstrated their mastery of land warfare (Balkans 
and Afghanistan), and neither unit has official international experience in naval warfare 
operations. As this study has shown, however, both units have focused training and 
exercises according to their service affiliation. Both units collectively represent 
capabilities within quadrant 1 and 2 of Figure 15. This is the flexibility NORSOF is 
assumed to represent today. Within the defined dichotomy, including the domain naval/ 
land warfare, NORSOF represents a less flexible SOF capability according to current 
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doctrine. Merging the two units is not in itself likely to alter this situation. On the 
contrary, merging the two units without specifying new roles is likely to diminish 
existing capabilities within one of the domains because of organizational preferences, 
pending a new unit’s organizational location (Army or Navy). Maintaining the status quo 
is therefore likely to be a better option if domain matters. This argument follows the same 
logic as do Tucker and Lamb in justifying their claims for a division of direct and indirect 
action capabilities in the US SOF.181  
Clarifying and adding core capabilities towards the indirect end of the spectrum of 
operations, which this paper suggests is necessary, will increase flexibility within the 
total range of capabilities. Again, merging the organizations is not likely to be a better 
option than maintaining the status quo. From a direct/indirect perspective on roles, the 
status quo does not necessarily require reference to SOF’s domain. However, if indirect 
action capabilities are required or desired within both quadrants 3 and 4, domain matters. 
The conclusion is therefore that the status quo is better than a merger in terms of future 
roles and missions. A merger is likely to reduce the existing capabilities. National 
interests are primarily within the maritime domain (see Chapter III). If NORSOF is 
merged and located within the Navy, land warfare capabilities will likely be diminished, 
and vice versa. From the perspective of national interests, establishing a new, merged 
SOF unit within the Navy seems more logical than not. 
2. Flexibility Within the Spectrum of Operations 
Flexibility within the spectrum of operations can be seen as a function of 
NORSOF’s capabilities. A continuous focus on direct action capabilities will necessarily 
limit the type of future conflicts that best suits both units. A direct action approach favors 
participation in campaigns or missions where force is brought to bear directly against the 
enemy. The initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom is a scenario where NORSOF is 
better prepared. NORSOF is less likely to make a difference in counterinsurgency 
operations or low intensity conflicts like in today’s Afghanistan and Iraq and on the 
African continent. This is not to say that NORSOF participation is irrelevant, but only 
 
181  Tucker and Lamb, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, 1-6. 
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that it is less relevant as a force if the overall strategy focuses on an indirect approach to 
solving the conflict. NATO’s ISAF mission clearly resembles the latter. 
Merging the units is therefore less likely to make a difference than continuing 
with the status quo because changing organization structure does not imply a change of 
tasks. Only by expanding existing roles will organization matter. While technically is 
there no problem with a unit maintaining several roles, in the case of direct and indirect 
capabilities, separating these roles is necessary, say Tucker and Lamb, to increase 
proficiency at the indirect approach. With both roles kept in a single unit or organization, 
the emphasis tends to be on direct action capabilities.182 Thus, by adding indirect 
capabilities as a core task, maintaining the status quo is a better option than a merger. The 
merger option is less desirable.  
3. Relevancy for NATO and UN Operations 
As this paper has shown, MJK and HJK are traditionally trained and equipped for 
NATO’s Article 5 scenario. For non-Article 5, Crisis Response Operations, NORSOF’s 
relevance will generally follow the same logic as above: MJK and HJK are more relevant 
in force-on-force scenarios, and less relevant for CRO unless these focus on direct action 
strategies. 
In principle, by virtue of its direct action focus NORSOF is a less relevant option 
for UN operations. Unless the objective is working by, with, and through indigenous 
forces, NORSOF’s primary contribution will arguably be as support to conventional 
operations and campaigns involving raids and intelligence collection. For some scenarios 
direct action capabilities might initially prove extremely valuable (Sudan and Congo are 
examples). However, offensive UN operations have a “mixed” reputation, as exemplified 
by Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993.183 The UN’s primary focus is to maintain 
impartiality to the belligerents. A direct action focus seems thus less optimal as a generic 
capability for future UN operations. Neither a merger nor the status quo will change this. 
 
182  Tucker and Lamb, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, 1-6. 
183  Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1999), 386. 
 86
                                                
Again, by adding consideration of indirect action capabilities, NORSOF is likely 
to be more relevant for the whole spectrum of NATO operations. ISAF is an example of 
CRO missions. The true dividend will be NORSOF’s relevance for UN operations. 
Adding indirect capabilities to increase relevance for NATO and the UN seems at first 
glance not to be organizationally conditioned. Following recent deployment patterns, it is 
unclear whether MJK’s or HJK’s service affiliation had an impact on operations. 
Therefore, whether or not NORSOF is merged into one unit seems less significant in 
terms of NATO and UN relevance, because relevance is tied to flexibility within a 
spectrum of tasks and a spectrum of operations. For NATO and the UN, national 
organization matters less.  
4. NORSOF Interoperability 
In any organization, level of interoperability is a function of subunits’ 
interdependence, i.e., “the extent to which departments depend on each other for 
resources or materials to accomplish their tasks.”184 According to Thomson, co-locating 
units within an organization is desired the more their joint task depends on mutual 
communication, and when the level of coordination is high. Daily face-to-face 
interaction, teamwork, and quicker decision-making are all benefits of increased 
closeness. Daft uses hospitals to illustrate business practices where co-location is both 
necessary and desired.185  
A military joint operation is an example of a task requiring high levels of 
communication and coordination. Co-location of task headquarters is the means to 
achieving the interaction between units necessary to shorten decision making processes 
and so forth. Whereas a hospital is permanently located and repeats tasks over time, a 
military task organization is normally established for a single mission limited by its 
objectives. Its various task units are not organizationally merged beyond the immediate 
mission. As missions change, so will the task organizations. 
 
184 Thomson in Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH: South-
Western College Publishing, 2003), 195. 
185 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH: South-Western 
College Publishing, 2003), 195. 
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Interoperability at the tactical level is a concern in direct action operations, 
especially in CT scenarios where margins of error and timing are critical. Tactics and 
procedures are developed to enhance intra-team cooperation to counter or diminish 
interoperability issues. MJK and HJK have both conducted joint operations with 
personnel or units from other nations; as long as teams are not mixed interoperability 
does not pose the greatest challenge.186 The purpose of small unit tactics is to manage 
interdependence in small teams, not in large formations. The only possible mission 
requiring a large formation is the national CT role. Maritime installations undoubtedly 
require more than a single twelve-man team for an attack. On the other hand, merging for 
the purpose of the national CT role has not been an issue until recently, indicating that 
either the previous national CT strategy was flawed, or that the threat has changed. What 
seems clear from the new wave of religious terrorism is that hostage scenarios are 
increasingly replaced with destructive suicidal operations. The main concern is now the 
combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.187  
This does not justify decreasing the national CT alert. And if the objective of a 
merger is to increase the national CT alert, merging MJK and HJK seems more 
appropriate than the status quo. If SO in a military context is to continue focusing on 
small unit tactics, merging units is not necessarily cost-effective beyond potential 
economic benefits. If increased interoperability requires MJK and HJK to merge will 
therefore hinge first of all on HJK’s ability to execute its classic CT mission within 
existing constraints. In other words, if the intent is for both units to retain the same 
primary missions, the most obvious solution is to merge. 
5. NORSOF’s Strategic Role 
This factor, more than any other, should, determine NORSOF’s organizational 
structure. The US learned after the Vietnam War, and later after the fatal 1980 raid on 
their embassy in Iran, that SOF could not function optimally as a strategic tool unless it 
was organizationally separated from the conventional military. SOF was not given 
 
186 Author’s personal experience based on participant observation in joint operations. 
187  David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism" in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of 
a Grand Strategy, eds. Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 46-73. 
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priority with regard to needs like manning and equipment. Through the establishment of 
USSOCOM, doctrines along with force funding were directed outside the conventional 
military organization.188 The UK SOF has a similar organization through the military 
strategic level (DSF). Yet both countries maintain service-based SOF units, arguably to 
maintain environmental capabilities. American and British foreign policy ambitions differ 
significantly from Norway’s, which should account for a different national approach 
when determining NORSOF’s strategic role and subsequent strategic organization. 
Whether the US or UK model is appropriate for Norwegian purposes is far from 
obvious. But the principles on which USSOCOM and DSF  are established might suggest 
what is required for NORSOF to act as a strategic asset. Today’s organization, depicted 
in Figure 5, is sufficient for strategic decision-making purposes, and resembles in some 
degree both the US and British models. It is questionable the extent to which the current 
organization is staffed and capable, however.189  
According to Figure 5, HJK, directly subordinate to the Chief of Army 
Operations, has a more favorable organizational location than MJK. HJK’s position 
within the Army allows for short communication lines to the strategic level as well as 
direct funding from a higher level within the military. MJK does not have this flexibility 
given its location within the Navy organization.190 Therefore, MJK and HJK are likely to 
develop differently because resources and priorities are likely to be viewed differently 
from service to service. For the strategic decision-maker, this situation will likely create a 
less coherent strategic NORSOF organization. Whether a merger or the status quo is 
better for the strategic outcome is unclear insofar as NORSOF continues to develop 
capabilities required by the strategic level. Like NAF in general, NORSOF is a small 
organization. Command lines are shorter and less bureaucratic compared with the US 
military.191  
 
188  USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command: History, 3-6. 
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(Basic Books, 1989). 
191 This assumption is based on discussions from the class DA3202, International Strategic Decision 
Making for Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2005.  
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Merging the units definitively quells turf wars and competition, but a merger is 
not likely to alter established roles and missions. Adopting the US model, which implies  
funding from outside the realm of the Service Chiefs, will effectively create a fourth 
service. Removing both units from the Service Chiefs’ domains, and continuing to claim 
service dependency, arguably makes little sense given NAF’s relative size. Creating a 
fourth service is therefore likely to result in a merged unit. Introducing new roles in a 
fourth service is likely to be suboptimal, again according to Tucker and Lamb, because of 
the dynamics between the two principal tasks. The direct action approach tends to be 
overemphasized and indirect action downplayed when applied in the same unit, an 
argument also made by Adams.192  
With regard to NORSOF’s strategic role, creating a separate service, effectively 
merging the two units, is therefore less likely to enhance NORSOF’s relevance, at least 
for international operations. NORSOF’s size and ambitions are simply too different from 
USSOCOM’s 50,000+ organization; it does not make sense to establish a fourth service 
for strategic purposes. As discussed in Chapter II, NORSOF’s strategic utility is 
questionable. It is, at best, not well-defined. One likely option is increased strategic 
guidance within the existing organizational framework.  However, this might marginalize 
the Service Chiefs’ authority and interests in their respective units. The challenge is to 
develop and utilize NORSOF as a strategic asset within the framework of the current 
command structure while maintaining relevance in the service-based context. The 
outcome of a merger for strategic purposes therefore is unclear. Strategic utility is likely 
to be more influenced by vertical command arrangements than by a tactical 
reorganization. 
 
C. CONCLUSION – IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The points covered in the preceding discussion are summarized in Table 2. The 
discussion is based on the assumption that indirect capabilities are added as a core 
capability. By introducing another capability, separate organizations are required for an 
optimal outcome. The conclusion is based also on the assumption that certain 
 
192  Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action. 
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environmental capabilities are better developed within a service domain if optimal 
performance is desired.  
 
Factors Merge Status Quo 
Spectrum of core capabilities - + 
Spectrum of operations  - + 
Relevance for NATO and UN 0 0 
NORSOF interoperability + 0 
NORSOF’s strategic role 0 0 
Table 2. Factors ranked for a merge or status quo  
 
Table 2 ranks the various factors more or less in accordance with St.prp.nr. 42 
(2003-2004). A plus sign (+) indicates a more favorable solution, a zero (0) indicates no 
significant difference, and a minus sign (-) indicates a less favorable solution with regard 
to merge/no merge. 
According to this analysis, whether NORSOF should merge or not depends first 
of all on the factors spectrum of core capabilities, spectrum of operations and 
interoperability. In summary, adding indirect capabilities as a primary capability is likely 
to suffer from a merger solution. Keeping the status quo is more favorable. If this is true, 
then merging MJK and HJK is not an ideal option with regard to new and expanded roles. 
That said, Tucker and Lamb do not advocate Navy and Army separation, only that direct 
and indirect action capabilities be separated organizationally. In other words, for national 
purposes, relocating MJK or HJK is certainly possible if indirect capabilities are the main 
issue. The existing Navy/Army division is first and foremost a question of environmental 
capabilities, meaning maritime and land warfare. Likewise, if interoperability with 
conventional units is not important, then service-based capabilities seem less necessary. 
Interoperability for joint national tasks will be improved by a merger. It is uncertain how 
much interoperability is necessary for international obligations. Future ambitions are not 
described thoroughly enough (at least in unclassified terms) to make any useful 
recommendation. The other factors highlighted as important for transformation seem less 
relevant to the question of merging the units.  
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Assuming that one accepts the existing organization to better support NORSOF 
relevance, the final question becomes how to divide the roles internal to NORSOF. For 
national defense purposes, the existing division of roles by service is as relevant today as 
during the Cold War. Given Norway’s maritime interests, it seems unreasonable to 
decrease existing maritime SO capabilities, while a war on national territory, though 
unlikely in the short term, would require land warfare SO capabilities.  
However, the previous and current governments have increased the emphasis on 
international operations, primarily within a NATO framework. The current government 
has focused on the UN as a likely framework while simultaneously de-emphasizing 
participation in US-led coalition operations. Afghanistan and ISAF will continue to be 
NAF’s focus in years to come. Likewise, the UN and Sudan is held as the next priority 
mission. By virtue of their landlocked locations, both Afghanistan and Sudan are in the 
domain of land warfare. If indirect capabilities are required to stabilize these conflicts, it 
seems natural that HJK be assigned the indirect warfare role as its primary responsibility. 
Assuming the Army in general will be involved in low intensity conflicts, counter- 
insurgency operations, nation building, and humanitarian operations, HJK will become 
increasingly relevant within NATO’s CRO and the UN’s peace support operations. 
Developing parts of NORSOF as an indirect force will thus improve Norway’s ability to 
offer NATO and the UN capabilities for operations outside the conventional realm.  
Direct action capabilities should continue as MJK’s primary role. The focus must 
continue to be maritime capabilities. If MJK’s focus shifts towards land warfare 
capabilities, its relevance as a Navy unit will be questioned. MJK’s challenge is thus to 
balance its maritime focus against naturally overlapping SOF capabilities. If economic 
considerations motivate the merger/no merger discussion, maintaining two units trained 
and equipped for the same land warfare scenarios will necessarily raise both costs and 
doubts about the redundancy.  Because Norway’s main national interests are maritime, a 
continuous concern with maritime SO is reasonable.  
In an international context, MJK, with its maritime, direct action capabilities, 
could be Norway’s SO niche capability contribution to NATO’s response force. Given 
it’s stated objective, NRF is more concerned with force-on-force scenarios than with 
nation building. This division of roles, at least in an international context, is also 
consistent with Barth-Eide’s suggestion to keep international responsibility for PSO and 
CRO operations with Army units and subsequently maintain NATO standby obligations 
through Navy and Air Force participation. At least the forces involved would know what 
scenarios to prepare for as their primary responsibility. Today’s situation, with more or 
less global participation across the whole spectrum of conflict, seems extremely 
ambitious given Norway’s foreign policy ambitions along with the current economic 
outlook for the NAF. 
A further question is whether this principal separation should affect HJK’s 
national CT role. Logically, the CT mission would fall into MJK’s domain since CT 
above all is a variant of direct action. It undoubtedly involves a maritime component 
when located offshore. However, given that HJK already is organized and trained for this 
task and has proven capable of sustaining it while deployed on international missions, it 
seems less than appropriate to transfer this organization. This conclusion is not obvious 
and, since CT is a tactical mission, has not been a focus of this paper.  
This division of roles and missions would enhance national capability across the 
spectrum of SO, which was a goal in St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004). The division would also 
underscore and increase NORSOF’s status as a niche capability, because NORSOF as a 
whole will be capable over a larger spectrum of conflicts. NORSOF future roles and 
missions are graphically illustrated in Figure 16, which separates national from 
international roles, shows maritime and land warfare in a national context, and 
distinguishes direct from indirect action in an international context. 
 




There clearly are challenges to the proposal presented in this thesis, which is to 
assign direct action capabilities as MJK’s primary role, and indirect action capabilities as 
HJK’s primary role. Likewise, the proposal is to separate both units in terms of primary 
international commitments. The first likely objection to this proposal is that it would   
degrade the national ability for SO strikes outside the maritime domain. In a national 
context, this might be less relevant, because all strategic targets are located on the 
coastline. Whether this counts as a maritime or land warfare approach in a SO context is 
therefore irrelevant. However, in an international context, it is not clear why Norway 
must support missions like, for example, offensive SO capabilities for Operation 
Enduring Freedom, except for the fact that offensive operations have become the only 
option because of the forces involved. With increased emphasis on indirect action 
capabilities, NORSOF in general and HJK in particular could represent a greater potential 
for alternative missions leading to the same strategic end. That said, an indirect approach 
requires more than indirect tactical capabilities; it also requires a strategic approach to 
indirect strategies. Although OEF was initially a SOF-dominated campaign, the Afghan 
insurgency has continued to gain momentum since 2002, and parts of the country seem 
less secure today than three years ago. This suggests that an indirect strategy has not been 
preferred or consistently pursued in OEF. Likewise, participation with maritime SO 
capabilities in scenarios other than OEF might have achieved the same political strategic 
effect as participation in OEF. In an international context, whether Norway should 
contribute primarily with land or maritime units (and whether they are direct action 
capable or not) seems unclear. From a national perspective, offering niche SO 
capabilities, trained and equipped for scenarios aligned with national interests, seems 
more appropriate than continuously developing units for all options, everywhere, at any 
time. The latter is more a matter of general capability than a niche. 
A second objection to this proposal might be based on the flawed belief that SOF, 
which enjoys a high status, can resolve all missions the conventional military cannot. 
This is simply not true. History reveals many missions where SOF were essential for 
success. But history also reveals failures. The British experience in the 1991 Gulf War 
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and the Ranger operation in Somalia in 1993 are but two examples.193 Both demonstrate 
that SOF operates with the same constraints as conventional units. To assume that SOF, 
by virtue of its status, is proficient in direct and indirect action because of doctrinal 
definitions is a misinterpretation of doctrine. Even Company Linge had to switch focus 
during WWII when a changed strategy required irregular warfare rather than commando- 
style raids.  
A third challenge to this proposal might involve concerns about joint operations, 
especially where maritime proficiency is required for indirect approaches. SOF technical 
assistance to a foreign maritime force offers an example. To the extent this is a problem, 
principles for joint SOF operations still apply. The US experience from the Philippines is 
that when naval expertise is necessary, Navy SEALs support the Army SF in their main 
effort.194 
The hypothesis initially proposed in this thesis was that current NORSOF 
organizational structure is inconsistent with future missions and roles. Based on a logical 
analysis of future missions and roles, the initial hypothesis appears to be false. Rather, 
future missions and roles instead seem to favor continuation of two units. By adding and 
clarifying roles and missions, NORSOF will maintain or increase its relevance. By 
maintaining maritime capabilities, NORSOF will continue to support Norway’s primary 
national interests. By adding indirect capabilities, NORSOF will become increasingly 
relevant for scenarios, especially in a NATO CRO and UN PSO context. To achieve the 
goals as stated St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004), NORSOF should emphasize developing 
additional skills to embrace the full concept of SO. To simply increase the size of existing 
forces in order to fulfill political expectations seems insufficient for meeting Norway’s 
future military needs. 
 
 
193 See Andy McNab, Bravo Two Zero (New York: Island Books/Dell, 1994); Bowden, Black Hawk 
Down: A Story of Modern War. 
194 According to LtCol Greg Wilson, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  
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